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Size

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The source must be provided. The source stating the size in the template box states a determined number, which is not 2 milions soldiers but up to 90,000. If someone has another source, he/she must provide it alongside his/her correction. --Mach1988 (talk) 12:53, 15 August 2015 (UTC)[reply]

"Monday 10, 2017"

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It's not a correct date. The month is missing. Ahyangyi (talk) 06:57, 28 November 2017 (UTC)[reply]

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A Commons file used on this page or its Wikidata item has been nominated for speedy deletion

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French and Arabic Article Links

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Can we get translations for the FR and AR Articles?  — Preceding unsigned comment added by Mr. Mesa (talk • contribs) 01:41, 23 March 2022 (UTC)[reply]
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Is it the political party from Morocco (cite 71)?
                                        Mr. Mesa (talk) 01:47, 23 March 2022 (UTC) Mr.Mesa[reply]

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A Commons file used on this page or its Wikidata item has been nominated for deletion

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The issue of paying allegiance to Iran

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Keep the following in mind when making any claim of PMF groups paying allegiance to Iran:

1. In light of the seriousness of the allegation, I would venture to claim that one would need official confirmation. Provide proper proof of official statements of the group or said group’s leaders wherein they openly admit to paying political allegiance to another state. Proof of the fact that Iran had a role in creating or supporting these groups, or that they have converging interests/ideologies is not sufficient; states around the world including U.S have created as well as support formal armed groups as well as informal groups, militias etc. would it be fair to claim that they pay allegiance to U.S simply because they were created by the U.S or receive support from it or they agree with each other ideologically?

2. Distinguish between political allegiance and Taqlid (jurisprudential emulation). Taqlid of individual people in any of these groups to Khamenei or any other Iranian or non-Iranian Mujtahid (even if it were true) does not equate to the whole group paying political allegiance to another state. (This has been suggested by some political commentators).

3. Obviously pay heed to the overall reliability and neutrality of the source provided. Montblamc1 (talk) 09:21, 25 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

We rely on what RS say. The vast majority of RS characterize the PMF as Iran-backed militias or proxies, asserting that they pledge allegiance to Iran. This source states that "The most powerful groups in the PMF are those that maintain strong links with Tehran and pledge spiritual allegiance to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei." Another source maintains that Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq maintains "Undeniable links to Iranian funding and religious allegiances to Iranian clerical rule." This source also states that both Kata'ib Hezbollah and the Badr Organization maintain a "strong connection to the Revolutionary Guards and its religious-political allegiance to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei," with the Badr Organization originally forming a subunit of the IRGC. On top of this, all of these groups share the ideologies of Khomeinism and Wilayat al-Faqih.[1] These factions are the largest within the PMF, making it clear that at least certain groups pledge allegiance to Iran and its Supreme Leader. Skitash (talk) 18:20, 27 December 2024 (UTC)[reply]
I invite you to read the talk page. Montblamc1 (talk) 15:52, 28 December 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Read what I wrote instead of merely pressing your POV. I clearly emphasised that it is important to distinguish between Taqleed and political allegiance to a state. Also, the only political allegiance claim of the source is specific to Badr. Is it proper then to add that the whole of PMF pays allegiance to Iran but add the caveat “certain factions”, when in reality there’s only one faction that the sources claim pay political allegiance to Khamenei according to the source. Is this a proper synthesis? It would be much more acceptable to add this detail to the body. Montblamc1 (talk) 16:05, 28 December 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Also, keep in mind the fact that PMF is legally part of the Iraqi Armed Forces and the article is about the collective PMF as a formation and not specific factions. So adding that the PMF pays allegiance to Iran even if it specified that only “some” do it is inaccurate, and the same applies to terrorism designation. The PMF is not a designated terrorist organisation, rather, groups that are part of the collective PMF are designated as such. It would not be accurate to add into the infobox that PMF is a designated terror organisation even if you specify that only some groups are designated as such. This type of hairsplitting does not belong to the infobox. Montblamc1 (talk) 16:11, 28 December 2024 (UTC)[reply]
It's not my "POV," it's what reliable sources state. "there’s only one faction that the sources claim pay political allegiance to Khamenei" Here is a source that states that Kata'ib Hezbollah has "boasted publicly about its military capabilities and allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader," and here's another that says "Along with the Badr Organization and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, they [Kata'ib Hezbollah] have pledged allegiance to Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei." I don't think it can get any clearer than this.
"PMF is legally part of the Iraqi Armed Forces" This doesn't mean anything since it is a fact that the PMF's "major leadership and decision makers often sat outside of" the control of the National Security Council.[2] Skitash (talk) 16:24, 28 December 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Badr Organization pledge loyalty to Ayatollah Hakim and Asaib Ahl al-Haq is loyal to Sadiq al-Sadr. Neither have any loyalty to Iran. The AAH leader Qais al-Khazali has explicitly opposed any Iranian military presence in Iraq viewing them as foreigners. That's not a sign of loyalty. The PMF, despite Iranian influence is an Iraqi organization and answers the Iraqi government. 37.237.117.30 (talk) 22:07, 28 December 2024 (UTC)[reply]
The PMF is an Iraqi military organization and claims of Iranian allegiance are very misleading and hurtful to the article. The head of PMF, Faleh Al Fayyadh,has explicitly stated that the PMF is under the command of the Iraq Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and is committed to his orders. His statement is far more important than opinions of some pro-American journalist. When PMF soldiers dies, their caskets are wrapped with Iraqi flags, which shows where they truly belong. 37.237.117.30 (talk) 22:40, 28 December 2024 (UTC)[reply]
Hello, please engage in my new talk discussion i have started in regards to this topic. I also believe this article is violating POV. Idk2716639 (talk) 17:43, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Semi-protected edit request on 28 December 2024

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Add in "Concerns about growth": As Kiki Santing shows in her new research, the group has gained influence over the reconstruction process in places like Mosul. This allows them to gain financial income and political influence and to control the process of rebuilding the city. She also claims to see signs of demographic change in the form of Shiization. https://kritarab.hypotheses.org/636 Bunn al-Abyad (talk) 19:32, 28 December 2024 (UTC)[reply]

 Not done: please provide reliable sources that support the change you want to be made. This source looks like a hypotheses, not being accepted by the major. Can you find a more reliable source? -Lemonaka 15:06, 25 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Semi-protected edit request on 17 May 2025

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I want to correct a typo. 78.162.131.210 (talk) 13:05, 17 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]

 Not done: it's not clear what changes you want to be made. Please mention the specific changes in a "change X to Y" format and provide a reliable source if appropriate. Skitash (talk) 14:11, 17 May 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Semi-protected edit request on 20 June 2025

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Typo: Change stratigic to strategic “ Several militant groups received training and stratigic aid from Hezbollah's Unit 3800.” 31.209.213.139 (talk) 18:07, 20 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]

 Done Skitash (talk) 18:14, 20 June 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Concern regarding repeated reversions

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I have provided crystal-clear explanations for my edits aimed at updating the article to reflect recent developments in the Middle East following the non-participation of Iraqi militia groups in the conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza & Iran. Specifically, the article currently overstates Iranian influence over Iraqi proxies, which has significantly waned, and the ideological description in the infobox—such as labeling “anti-Sunnism”—is inaccurate, as it appears to conflate isolated war crimes by rogue extremist fighters with the broader group ideology of the 230,000+ fighters (which LITERALLY includes Sunni armed groups, by the way. Not a politically charged statement.)

Despite these explanations, my edits have been repeatedly reverted without any sort of policy-based justification whatsoever. Additionally, it sort of appears that new users’ contributions are frequently reversed, while similar edits made by more established editors remain, raising my concerns about a potential bias or uneven application of editorial standards. (Just a thought.)

I encourage discussion on the article’s talk page to reach consensus, instead of unnecessary warnings such as directed towards my talk page. Thank you

(This is directed towards @Skitash:, but any other user may participate in this discussion) Idk2716639 (talk) 19:58, 24 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Please refrain from introducing your WP:OR to the article as you've done here. The militias openly pledged allegiance to Iran's Supreme Leader,[3][4] and cooperate with the IRGC,[5] not "accused" of doing so (your unsourced opinion). The PMF have never "denied" this either. Claims of fading Iranian influence or Axis losses are irrelevant to their allegiance, which remains intact. Skitash (talk) 00:33, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
PMF leaders consistently use nationalistic rhetoric, presenting themselves as an Iraqi state force defending Iraq’s sovereignty rather than pledging allegiance to a foreign leader; while everyone may question the credibility of this rhetoric, it is reflected in their lack of taking actions in Middle Eastern conflicts, which was out of them aligning with Iraqi state interests in regards to the regional turmoil. Please also review WP:OR and WP:RS, as providing sourced information is not original research, and it is inappropriate to dismiss sourced content as “unsourced opinion” Idk2716639 (talk) 02:40, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
The “pledged allegiance” claim comes from one instance of the PMF leader saying he was waiting on Khamenei’s guidance, which is not a formal pledge. And the alignment with iran is not even attributed to overall PMF leadership, but various militias (Kataib Hezbollah is an example). The source used is known to be extremely biased towards american interests Idk2716639 (talk) 02:43, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
@Skitash:’s editing history caught my eye, specifically highlighted by the Sunni Arab genocide in Iraq article, showing potential bias of some sorts against Iraq & Shia Muslims. All religious groups in Iraq endured mass killings. Hundreds of thousands of Shias, Christians & Yazidis combined were also killed during the years from 2003-2017. Thousands of Sunnis were killed by ISIS themselves. That article lacks credible sources supporting a full-scale genocide claim and appears politically charged, notably by potentially presenting convicted ISIS and al-Qaeda collaborators as “innocent Sunnis” sentenced to death, which misrepresents the facts. The article wasn’t even named “Allegations of Sunni Arab genocide in Iraq”. It was named the “Sunni Arab genocide in Iraq” which is extremely inaccurate. Removing my sourced info, removing the false allegations of PMF openly being anti-Sunni despite having Sunni groups, it’s obvious. This approach violates Wikipedia’s neutral language policy, which is also evident in the PMF article where an anti-Shia stance is apparent. Please adhere to WP:NPOV and WP:BLP guidelines to maintain neutrality and verifiability. Idk2716639 (talk) 02:56, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Could you please clarify where the figure of 22,000 deaths in the Sunni Arab genocide in Iraq article comes from? It supports my point to look at your prior editing history, to accurately identify potential reasons for the disruptive edits on this article. Idk2716639 (talk) 03:04, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
"PMF leaders consistently use nationalistic rhetoric, presenting themselves as an Iraqi state force" This does not negate the well documented fact that all of the most influential PMF leaders have pledged allegiance to the Ayatollah of Iran.
"The “pledged allegiance” claim comes from one instance of the PMF leader saying he was waiting on Khamenei’s guidance" That's not true. Numerous credible sources clearly support this:
  • The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future: "The most powerful groups in the PMF are those that maintain strong links with Tehran and pledge spiritual allegiance to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei," "Their leaders publicly take pride in such affiliations, professing religious allegiance to Ayatollah Khamenei and his notion of vilayat al-faqih."
  • Al-Kadhimi and the Kataib Hezbollah raid "It [KH] is a powerful militia and has boasted publicly about its military capabilities and allegiance to Iran's supreme leader. It is also one of the PM's staunchest enemies and strongly opposed his nomination."
  • Explaining the legitimacy of pro-Iran militias in Iraq: "Along with the Badr Organization and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, they [KH] have pledged allegiance to Iran's Ayatollah Khamenei."
  • Iraq Opens its Gates to Iran’s Trojan Horse: "PMF commanders swear allegiance to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Qassem Soleimani, chief of the IRGC’s Quds Force. The leader of one of the PMF’s constituent groups has gone so far as to say he would overthrow the Iraqi government if Khamenei ordered him to."
  • The Leadership and Purpose of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces: "The current Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) Chairman, Faleh al Fayyadh, has similarly cooperated with the IRGC to implement Iranian directives in Iraq and reinforce Iranian influence over the militias."
These aren't speculative theories as you're attempting to frame them. They're explicitly stated in the sources. Your addition of qualifiers such as "allegedly" or "accused of" (which do not appear in the sources) is misleading and misrepresents the content. Also, you have yet to explain how the opinion pieces you cited, which speculate about a potential waning of Iranian influence due to recent conflicts, have anything to do with the militias' loyalties to Tehran. Lastly, referencing a different article I contributed to feels like an attempt to derail this conversation. If you have issues with that article, the appropriate place to discuss it is on its talk page. Skitash (talk) 11:05, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I feel like I’ve gotten nowhere with this discussion as you completely disregard my points of you being biased, and disregard your other articles even though that’s required of me to do to understand your motives. I may have no choice but to report you. Idk2716639 (talk) 14:00, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Completely reverting neutralizing edits, fitting into one side’s bias, disregarding my points; it’s obvious. Idk2716639 (talk) 14:00, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
"I feel like I’ve gotten nowhere with this discussion" Feel free to answer my question whenever you're ready. Also, I suggest you familiarize yourself with WP:NPA and WP:AGF.
"Completely reverting neutralizing edits" Your "neutralizing edits" constitute unsourced WP:OR and are contested by more than one editor. Skitash (talk) 16:03, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I’ve already provided multiple reasons why my edits do not qualify as original research, as they were focused solely on neutralizing content that presents one side’s POV. Your disruptive edits, however, fully align with one perspective, which is the core of the neutrality issue being raised. At this point, it feels like there is nothing more to discuss, as my points have consistently been disregarded by you Idk2716639 (talk) 16:21, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Could you point out where in the sources you cited the terms "allegedly" and "accused of" appear? Furthermore, reverting your changes does not qualify as "disruptive edits." Per WP:ONUS, the responsibility for achieving consensus for inclusion falls on you, and from what I see, another editor is challenging your edits. Skitash (talk) 16:32, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
The sources you used primarily align with U.S. interests, which in themselves often highlight Iranian involvement but also acknowledge waning Iranian influence over the PMF—something reflected in my edits. Please read my other discussion comments, as I’ve already addressed why my changes were focused on neutrality rather than original research or being biased towards Shia POV.
Additionally, based on your and the other editor’s edit history, there appears to be a pattern of edits leaning against Shia groups, which may be influencing how this article is framed. Now don’t call this a “personal attack” Idk2716639 (talk) 16:39, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
You're not addressing my questions. And accusing editors of bias toward a religious group most certainly constitutes a personal attack, despite warnings from both me and @Acroterion.[6][7] Skitash (talk) 16:47, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
You warned me after my very first revert, which doesn’t align with how warnings are normally applied per Wikipedia guidelines (warnings are usually for repeated reverts or edit warring, not a single revert). I’ve already addressed the points you raised, including explaining the use of “alleged” and why it was necessary for neutrality. Why are you ignoring the explanations I’ve provided and continuing to dismiss these points without responding to them directly? Also, bias needs to be considered when evaluating edits and sources. The way content is being added and reverted seems to consistently fit one side’s POV, which is why neutrality concerns are being raised. This isn’t about personal motives but about ensuring the article meets WP:NPOV. Understanding why edits may lean in one direction is part of addressing the neutrality dispute fairly. The other moderator’s warning was completely irrelevant in this conversation as it was related to my prior report against your actions. Idk2716639 (talk) 16:51, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
There is no "other moderator," Skitash isn't an administrator, and I am. You are going to be blocked if you make any more references to your perceptions of another editor's motivations, or if you selectively interpret my warning as anything else than to stop making aspersions against other editors' motivations, anywhere. Acroterion (talk) 16:57, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Ok, I’ll stop mentioning any perception of his motivations. But what about his other disruptive actions, such as warning me right after my very first revert and consistently removing sourced and neutral information? How come he isn’t receiving warnings for those actions as well? Idk2716639 (talk) 17:01, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Because that isn't what he's doing. MilesVorkosigan (talk) 22:50, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Yes it was what he was doing, check the history of editing on this article and my talk page and compare the timestamps Idk2716639 (talk) 01:36, 26 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Article’s bias

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I have a dispute regarding the neutrality of this article. The current wording overemphasizes Iranian control, despite evidence showing that Iranian influence has waned, although not fully disappear, after the 2024 Lebanon war & Iran-Israel war;


Sources: New York Post, Turkiye Today, The Washington Institute, Iran International, NZZ, Amwaj, Asharq Al-Awsat, The Washington Post, Long War Journal, The Arab Weekly, The New Arab, Iran News Update , The Economist, Foreign Affairs, The Atlantic, Shafaq, News Week & New Arab


All news outlets speak of the Iraqi government issuing orders that the PMF has fully followed, in avoiding wars in Lebanon and Iran, showing limited Iranian control of the PMF. To summarize: recent conflicts have further redirected the PMF to partially operate under Iraqi government alignment, leaving Iran with very limited control. Check the sources. Nothing here is original research

Additionally, claims of systemic anti‑Sunnism in the article are misleading, as they appear to be based on actions of rogue actors who committed atrocities against Sunni civilians, actions that were not ordered or supported by PMF leadership. Official statements and orders do not reflect such ideology, and the organization even includes Sunni groups within its ranks. Idk2716639 (talk) 15:44, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

The situation of the PMF is highly complex. Individual factions operate under varying levels of Iranian influence, but overall, the PMF has shown significant instances of following the Iraqi government’s orders. For example, during operations against ISIS remnants, the PMF received and acted upon directives from the Prime Minister, and also they have refrained from supporting Syria’s former government prior to the Fall of Assad, demonstrating their common alignment with state authority rather than functioning as an entirely foreign-controlled entity. View: New Arab Idk2716639 (talk) 17:26, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Another factor to consider is that some PMF factions pledge allegiance primarily to their own leaders rather than directly to external actors or even the central government. This complicates the overall structure and control of the PMF, as these groups operate with their own internal hierarchies and priorities. While many have followed Iraqi government orders—such as during operations against ISIS remnants—others maintain semi‑independent loyalties, which makes it overly simplistic to portray the entire PMF as being under one single influence. Idk2716639 (talk) 17:38, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Instead of just listing a bunch of sources and then making claims, I'd suggest finding quotes from those sources that support the changes you want to make and showing them here. MilesVorkosigan (talk) 22:51, 25 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Well it was meant for the user to read the entire article and check the overall info. I will be doing that later Idk2716639 (talk) 01:38, 26 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Nonsensical stonewalling

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@Skitash @R3YBOl

Since both of you have a problem with my edits, come here and discuss them and let’s reach consensus. No funny business. We’ll reach consensus on this “allegiance” issue that seems to be bothering you so much and put an end to this nonsense. We will discuss all of your concerns here until we reach consensus. If not, I will take it to arbitration.

Carnegie Middle East Centre states here[1] that PMF is composed of three different categories, each pledging allegiance to different people.

The PMF contains three distinct factions, based on various subgroups’ respective allegiances to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and Muqtada al-Sadr.

Based on this, I created a section where I’ve made this distinction explicit. Feel free to explain why this is wrong.

I’ve removed the edit that claims that Khamenei is the Supreme Leader of PMF, since no source in the article claims this. Feel free to bring me that source exactly that claims Khamenei is the Supreme Leader of PMF. Montblamc1 (talk) 17:46, 12 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Per all the cited reliable sources, nearly all groups within the PMF, including all of the most powerful ones, such as Kata'ib Hezbollah, Badr Organization, and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, openly pledge allegiance to the Supreme Leader of Iran,[8][9][10][11] hence why he is included in the infobox as the de facto authority over the PMF. This allegiance is doctrinal, rooted in Khamenei's notion of Vilayat al-Faqih,[12] with the PMF Chief of Staff committing to execute Khamenei's orders and cooperating with the iRGC to "implement Iranian directives in Iraq and reinforce Iranian influence over the militias."[13]
As for your argument that the PMF is made up of three distinct factions (aligned with Khamenei, Sistani, and al-Sadr), that is based on an outdated source. The source is too old to consider the fact that Sistanist factions withdrew from the PMF in 2020 due to its ties to Iran (which weakened the PMF's legitimacy as Sistani's 2014 fatwa had originally bolstered it)[14] and Muqtada al-Sadr's withdrawal from politics in 2022 which led to the 2022 Baghdad clashes between the Khomeinist and Sadrist factions.[15] This essentially made the Sadrists irrelevant and left the Khomeinists completely dominating the PMF.[16] Skitash (talk) 19:21, 12 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Carnegie Middle East Centre states here[1] that PMF is composed of three different categories, each pledging allegiance to different people.The PMF contains three distinct factions, based on various subgroups’ respective allegiances to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and Muqtada al-Sadr. I did a quick research about Muqtada al-Sadr and his relations with the PMF. I came up with a source that narrated Muqtada's speech about that the PMF movement and its followers "are not affiliated with his movement or coordination framework". R3YBOl (🌲) 19:41, 12 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
How convenient to say the source is too old when it comes to my claim but is still used in the article for your claims. How convenient indeed. Where is your proof that pro Sistani groups withdrew? This was denied a long time ago[2] and groups like Firqat al-Abbas al-Qitaliyah (a pro-Sistani group) still receives salaries and is an active group of PMF. And read my message again and think carefully about what I am asking you. I am not disputing groups within the group pledging allegiance to Khamenei so why does your answer include trying to convince me that the most powerful groups within PMF pledge allegiance to Khamenei? I don’t disagree with this. I asked you to tell me why my creating a section outlining the difference between the groups and their allegiances is wrong? Answer why it is wrong? Is your point that the source is too old? Then what about these sources? [3][4][5][6][7][8] Montblamc1 (talk) 20:49, 12 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]
And about your claim that Muqtada claimed not to be part of PMF, sorry but you’ve clearly misread the article. You’ve clearly not understood the Arabic in the article. Muqtada said (ليس محسوبا على احد) which means that the PMF is not the property of any group, not that he refused to be associated with it . Montblamc1 (talk) 20:53, 12 October 2025 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2017/04/the-popular-mobilization-forces-and-iraqs-future?lang=en
  2. ^ https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/04/03/sistani-versus-khamenei-on-iraqs-hashd-al-shaabi/
  3. ^ https://euaa.europa.eu/country-guidance-iraq-2022/12-popular-mobilisation-forces-and-tribal-mobilisation-militias
  4. ^ https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/role-popular-mobilization-forces-iraqi-political-process
  5. ^ https://newlinesmag.com/argument/iran-and-iraq-are-competing-over-leadership-of-shiite-islam-after-sistani/
  6. ^ https://shafaq.com/amp/en/Security/PMF-factions-deepen-Iran-ties-fueling-Iraqi-tensions
  7. ^ https://journal.iag.ir/article_210579_c5e85389a07f184d67e4f758344fe545.pdf
  8. ^ https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/2021-02-25-networks-of-power-mansour.pdf
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