Suez Crisis

Not to be confused with the Raid on the Suez Canal or 2021 Suez Canal obstruction.

Suez Crisis
Part of the Cold War and the Arab–Israeli conflict
Destroyed Egyptian M4 Sherman in the Sinai Peninsula
Date 29 October – 7 November 1956 (1956-10-29 – 1956-11-07) (1 week and 2 days) Location Egypt (from the Gaza Strip to the Suez Canal) Result See § Aftermath Territorial changes Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip until March 1957
Belligerents
Israel United Kingdom  France	Egypt
Commanders and leaders
David Ben-Gurion  Moshe Dayan  Asaf Simhoni †  Haim Bar-Lev  Avraham Yoffe  Israel Tal  Ariel Sharon  Uri Ben-Ari  Anthony Eden  Gerald Templer  Charles Keightley  Hugh Stockwell  Denis Barnett  Manley Power  René Coty  Guy Mollet  Pierre Barjot  André Beaufre  Jacques Massu	Gamal Abdel Nasser  Abdel Hakim Amer  Saadedden Mutawally  Sami Yassa  Jaafar al-Abd  Salahedin Moguy  Raouf Mahfouz Zaki
Strength
175,000  45,000  34,000	90,000
Casualties and losses
Israel: 172 killed 817 wounded 1 captured United Kingdom: 22 killed 96 wounded France: 10 killed 33 wounded	1,650–3,000 killed 4,900 wounded 5,000–30,000+ captured 215+ aircraft destroyed 125 tanks destroyed
1,000 civilians killed

The Suez Crisis, also known as the second Arab–Israeli war, the Tripartite Aggression in the Arab world and the Sinai War in Israel, was a British–French–Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956. Israel invaded on 29 October, having done so with the primary objective of re-opening the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as the recent tightening of the eight-year-long Egyptian blockade further prevented Israeli passage. After issuing a joint ultimatum for a ceasefire, the United Kingdom and France joined the Israelis on 5 November, seeking to depose Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and regain control of the Suez Canal, which Nasser had nationalised earlier in the year.

Shortly after the invasion began, the three countries came under heavy political pressure from both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as from the United Nations, eventually prompting their withdrawal from Egypt.

The crisis demonstrated that the United Kingdom and France could no longer pursue their independent foreign policy without consent from the United States. Israel's four-month-long occupation of the Egyptian-occupied Gaza Strip and Egypt's Sinai Peninsula enabled it to attain freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran, but the Suez Canal was closed from October 1956 to March 1957.

The crisis strengthened Nasser's standing and led to international humiliation for the British—with historians arguing that it signified the end of its role as a world superpower—as well as the French amid the Cold War (which established the US and the USSR as the world's superpowers). As a result of the conflict, the UN established an emergency force to police and patrol the Egypt–Israel border, while British prime minister Anthony Eden resigned from his position. For his diplomatic efforts in resolving the conflict through UN initiatives, Canadian external affairs minister Lester B. Pearson received a Nobel Peace Prize.

Analysts have argued that the crisis may have emboldened the USSR, prompting the Soviet invasion of Hungary.

Background

The Suez Canal before 1945

See also: Suez Canal and Convention of Constantinople

The location of the Suez Canal, which connects the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean via the Red Sea.

The Suez Canal opened in 1869, financed by the French and Egyptian governments. The canal was operated by the Suez Company, an Egyptian-chartered company; the area surrounding the canal remained sovereign Egyptian territory.

The canal was strategically important, as it provided the shortest ocean link between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.

In 1875, as a result of debt and financial crisis, Egypt was forced to sell its shares in the operating company to the British government. They obtained a 44% share in the company for £4 million (equivalent to £476 million in 2023). With the 1882 invasion and occupation of Egypt, the UK took de facto control of the country as well as the canal, its finances and operations.

The 1888 Convention of Constantinople declared the canal a neutral zone under British protection. In ratifying it, the Ottoman Empire agreed to permit international shipping to pass freely through the canal, in time of war and peace.

Despite this convention, Britain closed the canal on several occasions. During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, the British denied the Russian Baltic Fleet use of the canal after the Dogger Bank incident and forced it to sail around Africa, giving the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces time to consolidate their position. During the First World War, Britain and France closed the canal to non-Allied shipping.

1945-1952

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Britain's military complex at Suez was one of the largest military installations in the world. The Suez base was an important part of Britain's strategic position in the Middle East; however, it became a source of growing tension in Anglo-Egyptian relations.

The canal continued to be strategically important after the Second World War for oil shipment. Western Europe then imported two million barrels per day from the Middle East, 1,200,000 by tanker through the canal, and another 800,000 via pipeline from the Persian Gulf (Trans-Arabian Pipeline) and Kirkuk (Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline) to the Mediterranean. These pipeline routes were prone to instability, which led British leaders to prefer to use the sea route through the canal.

Egypt's domestic politics were experiencing a radical change. Unrest began to manifest in the growth of radical political groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and an increasingly hostile attitude towards Britain and its presence. Added to this anti-British fervour was the role Britain had played in the creation of Israel.

In October 1951, the Egyptian government unilaterally abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the terms of which granted Britain a lease on the Suez base for 20 more years. Britain refused to withdraw from Suez, relying upon its treaty rights, as well as the presence of the Suez garrison. This resulted in an escalation in violent hostility towards Britain and its troops in Egypt.

The Egyptian Revolution

Main article: Egyptian revolution of 1952

In January 1952, British forces attempted to disarm a troublesome auxiliary police force barracks in Ismailia, resulting in the deaths of 41 Egyptians. This led to anti-Western riots in Cairo resulting in damage to property and the deaths of foreigners. This proved to be a catalyst for the removal of the Egyptian monarchy. On 23 July 1952 a military coup by the Egyptian nationalist 'Free Officers Movement'—led by Muhammad Neguib and Gamal Abdul Nasser—overthrew King Farouk.

After the 1952 Egyptian Revolution

Egypt and the United States

The Eisenhower administration saw the Near East as a huge gap into which Soviet influence could be projected, and accordingly required an American-supported security system. American diplomats favoured the creation of a NATO-type organisation (the Middle East Defense Organization, or MEDO) in the Near East and centred on Egypt to provide the necessary military power to deter the Soviets from invading.

American policy was torn between a desire to maintain good relations with NATO allies such as Britain and France who were major colonial powers, and to align Third World nationalists, who resented British and French influence, with the Free World camp. From 1953 onwards, American diplomacy had attempted unsuccessfully to persuade the powers involved in the Near East, local and imperial, to unite against the Soviets. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles found to his astonishment that the Arab states were "more fearful of Zionism than of the Communists" in 1953.

Nasser did not share Dulles's fear of the Soviet Union and instead wanted the end of British influence in the Middle East. The CIA offered Nasser a $3 million bribe if he would join the proposed Middle East Defense Organization; Nasser took the money, but refused to join. Nasser wanted an Egyptian-dominated Arab League to be the principal defence organisation in the Near East, which might be informally associated with the United States.

Dulles told Eisenhower in a report of May 1953 that the Arab states believed that the United States would back Israel in aggressive expansion, and that the prestige of Western democracy in the Middle East was very low. The immediate consequence was a proposed new policy of "even-handedness" where the United States very publicly sided with the Arab states in disputes with Israel in 1953–54. Moreover, Dulles did not share any sentimental regard for the Anglo-American "special relationship", which led the Americans to lean towards the Egyptian side in the Anglo-Egyptian disputes. During the negotiations over the British evacuation of the Suez Canal base in 1954–55, the Americans supported Egypt, though trying hard to limit the extent of the damage this might cause to Anglo-American relations.

Most of all, Nasser wanted the United States to supply arms on a generous scale to Egypt. Nasser refused to promise that any US arms he might buy would not be used against Israel, and rejected out of hand the American demand for a Military Assistance Advisory Group to be sent to Egypt as part of the arms sales. His frequent anti-Zionist speeches and sponsorship of the Palestinian fedayeen rendered it difficult for the Eisenhower administration to get the approval of Congress necessary to sell weapons to Egypt.

Egypt and Britain

Britain's desire to mend Anglo-Egyptian relations in the wake of the coup saw the country strive for rapprochement throughout 1953-54. In October 1954, Britain and Egypt concluded the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the phased evacuation of British Armed Forces troops from the Suez base. Great Britain would withdraw all troops within 20 months, maintain the base, and retain a right to return for seven years. The Suez Company would revert to the Egyptian government in 1968.

The Baghdad Pact

Main article: Central Treaty Organization

Egyptian foreign policy under Nasser saw the entire Middle East as Egypt's rightful sphere of influence, and opposed all Western security initiatives in the Near East. Nasse believed that neither his regime nor Egypt's independence would be safe until Egypt had established itself as head of the Arab world. There was a feud between Nasser and the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri al-Said, for Arab leadership. The creation of the Baghdad Pact, (later the Central Treaty Organization) a Middle Eastern anti-Communist alliance of Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Iraq and the UK, in 1955 seemed to confirm Nasser's fears Britain was attempting to draw the Eastern Arab World into a bloc centred upon Iraq and sympathetic to Britain.

The conclusion of the Baghdad Pact occurred almost simultaneously with a dramatic Israeli reprisal operation on the Gaza Strip on 28 February 1955 in retaliation for Palestinian fedayeen raids into Israel.

The close occurrence of the two events was mistakenly interpreted by Nasser as part of coordinated Western effort to push him into joining the Baghdad Pact. The signing of the Baghdad Pact and the Gaza raid marked the beginning of the end of Nasser's good relations with the Americans.Throughout 1955 and 1956, Nasser pursued a number of policies that would frustrate British aims throughout the Middle East, and result in increasing hostility between Britain and Egypt. Nasser also began to align Egypt with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia—whose rulers were hereditary enemies of the Hashemites—in an effort to frustrate British efforts to draw Syria, Jordan and Lebanon into the orbit of the Baghdad Pact.

Egypt and the Communist World

See also: Egyptian–Czechoslovak arms deal

Nasser had first broached the subject of buying weapons from the Soviet Union in 1954, as a way of pressuring the Americans into selling him the arms he desired. Instead of siding with either superpower, Nasser tried to have them compete in attempts to buy his friendship. During secret talks with the Soviets in 1955, Nasser's demands for weapons were more than amply satisfied. The news in September 1955 of the Egyptian purchase of a huge quantity of Soviet arms via Czechoslovakia was seen by the West as a major increase in Soviet influence in the Near East. In Britain, the increase of Soviet influence in the Near East was seen as an ominous development that threatened to put an end to British influence in the region.

Egypt and Israel

Prior to 1955, Nasser had pursued efforts to reach peace with Israel and had worked to prevent cross-border Palestinian attacks. After the February 1955 Israeli raid on the Egyptian Army headquarters in Gaza in retaliation for a Palestinian fedayeen attack that killed an Israeli civilian, Nasser began allowing raids into Israel by the Palestinian militants. Egypt established fedayeen bases not just in Gaza but also in Jordan and Lebanon. The raids triggered a series of Israeli reprisal operations.

Israel wanted to occupy and annex both the Gaza Strip and the Sinai and exercise control over the Gulf of Aqaba.

The Israelis were concerned by Egypt's procurement of large amounts of Soviet weaponry. The influx of this advanced weaponry altered an already shaky balance of power. Israel believed it had only a narrow window of opportunity to hit Egypt's army. Additionally, Israel believed Egypt had formed a secret alliance with Jordan and Syria.

Egypt and France

See also: Algerian War

France and Israel were allied against Egypt, in part due to Egyptian support of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) rebels against the French. The French saw Nasser as a major threat. By early 1955, France was shipping large amounts of weapons to Israel, and by 1956 France agreed to disregard the Tripartite Declaration, and supply even more weapons to Israel. In 1956, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres informed the French that Israel had decided upon war with Egypt in 1956. Peres claimed that Nasser was a genocidal maniac intent upon not only destroying Israel, but also exterminating its people, and as such, Israel wanted a war before Egypt received even more Soviet weapons, and there was still a possibility of victory for the Jewish state.

Egyptian policies in 1956

In January 1956, to end the incipient arms race between Egypt, armed by the Soviet Union, and Israel, armed by France, which he saw as opening the Near East to Soviet influence, Eisenhower launched a major effort to make peace between Egypt and Israel. Eisenhower sent his close friend Robert B. Anderson to serve as a secret envoy, who offered large quantities of American aid in exchange for a peace treaty with Israel. Nasser and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion had conflicting demands and the meetings were unsuccessful.

A second round of secret diplomacy by Anderson in February 1956 was equally unsuccessful. It is not clear if Nasser was sincerely interested in peace, or just merely saying what the Americans wanted to hear in the hope of obtaining American funding for the Aswan high dam and American weapons. However, the British historian P. J. Vatikitos noted that Nasser's determination to promote Egypt as the world's foremost anti-Zionist state as a way of reinforcing his claim to Arab leadership meant that peace was unlikely.

Nasser sponsored demonstrations in Amman which led King Hussein of Jordan to dismiss the British Commander of the Arab Legion, John Bagot Glubb (known to the Arabs as Glubb Pasha) in March 1956.After the sacking of Glubb Pasha, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden became consumed with an obsessional hatred for Nasser, and from March 1956 onwards, was in private committed to the overthrow of Nasser. As one British politician recalled:

For Eden ... this was the last straw.... This reverse, he insisted was Nasser's doing.... Nasser was our Enemy No. 1 in the Middle East and he would not rest until he destroyed all our friends and eliminated the last vestiges of our influence.... Nasser must therefore be ... destroyed.

The American historian Donald Neff wrote that Eden's often hysterical and overwrought views towards Nasser reflected the influence of the amphetamines to which Eden had become addicted following a botched operation in 1953 together with the related effects of sustained sleep deprivation (Eden slept on average about 5 hours per night in early 1956).

On 16 May 1956, Nasser officially recognised the People's Republic of China, which angered the US and Secretary Dulles This move, coupled with the impression that the project was beyond Egypt's economic capabilities, caused Eisenhower to withdraw all American financial aid for the Aswan Dam project on 19 July. The Eisenhower administration believed that if Nasser were able to secure Soviet economic support for the high dam, that would be beyond the capacity of the Soviet Union to support, and in turn would strain Soviet–Egyptian relations.

Nationalisation of the Suez Canal

See also: Closure of the Suez Canal (1956–1957)

Nasser announces the nationalisation of the canal (Universal Newsreel, 30 July 1956).

Port Said, at the entrance to the Suez Canal from the Mediterranean.

On 26 July 1956, in a speech in Alexandria, Nasser announced the nationalization of the canal. During his speech he used the name of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the builder of the canal, as a code-word for Egyptian forces to seize control of the canal hEgypt closed the canal to Israeli shipping. Egypt also closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and blockaded the Gulf of Aqaba, in contravention of the Constantinople Convention of 1888. Many argued that this was also a violation of the 1949 Armistice Agreements.

The Egyptian historian Abd al-Azim Ramadan notes Nasser's decision to nationalise the Suez Canal without political consultation as an example of his predilection for solitary decision-making.

British response

The nationalisation surprised Britain and its Commonwealth. There had been no discussion of the canal at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London in late June and early July. Egypt's action threatened British economic and military interests in the region.

Prime Minister Eden was under immense domestic pressure from Conservative MPs who drew direct comparisons between the events of 1956 and those of the Munich Agreement in 1938. Since the US government did not support the British protests, the British government decided in favour of military intervention against Egypt to keep the oil supply flowing and avoid the complete collapse of British influence in the region.

Eden was hosting a dinner for King Feisal II of Iraq and his Prime Minister. Leader of the Opposition Hugh Gaitskell was also at the dinner. He immediately agreed that military action might be inevitable, but warned Eden would have to keep the Americans closely informed. Eden believed that Parliament would support him; Gaitskell spoke for the Labour Party when he called the nationalisation a "high-handed and totally unjustifiable step". When Eden made a ministerial broadcast on the nationalisation, Labour declined its right to reply.

However, Gaitskell's support became more cautious as time went on. In two letters to Eden sent on 3 and 10 August 1956, Gaitskell condemned Nasser but warned that he would not support any action that violated the United Nations Charter, including an armed attack.

Two dozen Labour MPs issued a statement on 8 August stating that forcing Nasser to denationalise the canal against Egypt's wishes would violate the UN charter. Former Labour Foreign Minister Herbert Morrison hinted that he would support unilateral action by the government. Jo Grimond, who became Leader of the Liberal Party that November, thought if Nasser went unchallenged the whole Middle East would go his way.

The nationalisation was perceived as a direct threat to British interests. In a letter to the British Ambassador on 10 September 1956, Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office wrote:

If we sit back while Nasser consolidates his position and gradually acquires control of the oil-bearing countries, he can and is, according to our information, resolved to wreck us. If Middle Eastern oil is denied to us for a year or two, our gold reserves will disappear. If our gold reserves disappear, the sterling area disintegrates. If the sterling area disintegrates and we have no reserves, we shall not be able to maintain a force in Germany, or indeed, anywhere else. I doubt whether we shall be able to pay for the bare minimum necessary for our defence. And a country that cannot provide for its defence is finished.

Direct military intervention, however, ran the risk of angering Washington and damaging Anglo-Arab relations. As a result, the British government concluded a secret military pact with France and Israel that was aimed at regaining control over the Suez Canal.

French response

The French Prime Minister Guy Mollet, outraged by Nasser's move, determined that Nasser would not get his way. French public opinion very much supported Mollet, and apart from the French Communist Party, all of the criticism of his government came from the right, who very publicly doubted that a socialist like Mollet had the guts to go to war with Nasser.

1956 newsreels about Western reactions to the nationalisation. Pictured: John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State, and British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd at conference in London.

On 29 July 1956, the French Cabinet decided upon military action against Egypt in alliance with Israel. Britain was informed, and invited to co-operate if interested. At the same time, Mollet felt very much offended by what he considered to be the lackadaisical attitude of the Eisenhower administration to the nationalisation. This was especially the case because France had remained loyal to NATO even after the USSR had offered the French a deal earlier that year in which Paris would remain in NATO but become "semi-neutralist" in the Cold War if Moscow ended its support of the FLN in Algeria. In Mollet's view, his fidelity to NATO had earned him the right to expect firm American support against Egypt, and when that support proved not forthcoming, he became even more determined that if the Americans were not willing to do anything about Nasser, then France would act.

Commonwealth response

By 1956 the Panama Canal was much more important than the Suez to Australia and New Zealand. However, many still called the Suez Canal their "lifeline" to Britain or "jugular vein". Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies and New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland both supported Britain in the early weeks following the seizure. Menzies travelled to London from the United States after hearing of the nationalisation and became an informal member of the British Cabinet discussing the issue.

The "non-white Dominions" saw Egypt's seizing of the canal as an admirable act of anti-imperialism, and Nasser's Arab nationalism as similar to Asian nationalism. As India was a major user of the canal, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru remained publicly neutral other than warning that any use of force, or threats, could be "disastrous". Pakistan was also cautious about supporting Egypt given their rivalry as leading Islamic nations, but its government did state that Nasser had the right to nationalise.

Diplomatic solutions

On 1 August 1956, a tripartite meeting was opened at 10 Downing Street between British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, US Ambassador Robert D. Murphy and French Foreign Affairs Minister Christian Pineau.

Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies led an international committee in negotiations with Nasser in September 1956, which sought to achieve international management of the Suez Canal. The mission was a failure.

Almost immediately after the nationalisation, Eisenhower suggested to Eden a conference of maritime nations that used the canal. The British preferred to invite the most important countries, but the Americans believed that inviting as many as possible amid maximum publicity would affect world opinion. The eight surviving signatories of the Constantinople Convention and the 16 other largest users of the canal were invited: Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, West Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Soviet Union, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All except Egypt—which sent an observer, and used India and the Soviet Union to represent its interests—and Greece accepted the invitation, and the 22 nations' representatives met in London from 16 to 23 August.

Fifteen of the nations supported the American-British-French position of international operation of the canal. Ceylon, Indonesia, and the Soviet Union supported India's competing proposal—which Nasser had preapproved—of international supervision only. India criticised Egypt's seizure of the canal, but insisted that its ownership and operation remain in Egyptian hands. The majority of 18 chose five nations to negotiate with Nasser in Cairo led by Menzies, while their proposal for international operation of the canal would go to the Security Council.

Menzies' argued for compensation for the Suez Canal Company and the "establishment of principles" for the future use of the canal in a 7 September official communique to Nasser, and called for a convention to recognise Egyptian sovereignty of the canal, but for the establishment of an international body to run the canal. Nasser rejected Menzies' proposals. Menzies hinted to Nasser that Britain and France might use force to resolve the crisis, but the US openly opposed the use of force and Menzies left Egypt without success.

The United States proposed an association of canal users that would set rules for its operation. Fourteen of the other nations, not including Pakistan, agreed. Britain believed that violation of the association rules would result in military force, but the United States opposed military action. Eisenhower felt the crisis had to be handled peacefully; he told Eden that American public opinion, and the international community, "would be outraged" unless all peaceful routes had been exhausted. The Americans refused to support any move that could be seen as imperialism or colonialism, seeing the US as the champion of decolonisation.

"The British and French reluctantly agreed to pursue the diplomatic avenue but viewed it as merely an attempt to buy time, during which they continued their military preparations." The British disregarded Eisenhower's argument that the American people would not accept a military solution, and doubted that Eisenhower had a determination to avoid war. Eden and other leading British officials believed that Nasser's engagement with communist states, support for Palestinian fedayeen, and attempts to destabilise pro-Western Arab regimes, would persuade the Americans to accept British and French actions if they were presented as a fait accompli.

Protocol of Sèvres

Main article: Protocol of Sèvres

France, Israel and the United Kingdom reached a secret agreement regarding political and military cooperation to overthrow Nasser and de-nationalise the Canal during discussions held between 22 and 24 October 1956 in Sèvres, France. Under the terms of the Protocol, Israel would attack Egypt on 29 October. The British and French governments would issue a joint appeal for both Egypt and Israel to cease firing and withdraw 10 miles from the canal. If both forces rejected this demand (a guarantee, since Israel was already aware of it), the French and British militaries would attack on 31 October.

Forces

British

Universal Newsreel from 6 August about the departure of British and French ships for Egypt

The 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group, which was intended to be the main British strike force against Egypt, was heavily involved in the Cyprus Emergency, which led to a neglect of paratroop training in favour of counter-insurgency operations. The Royal Navy could project formidable power through the guns of its warships and aircraft flown from its carriers, but lacked amphibious capability.

The Royal Air Force (RAF) had just introduced two long-range bombers, the Vickers Valiant and the English Electric Canberra, but had not yet established proper bombing techniques for these aircraft. General Charles Keightley, the commander of the invasion force, believed that air power alone was sufficient to defeat Egypt. By contrast, General Hugh Stockwell, the Task Force's ground commander, believed that methodical and systematic armoured operations centred on the Centurion battle tank would be the key to victory.

French

French troops were experienced and well-trained but suffered from cutbacks imposed by post-war politics of economic austerity. In 1956, the French Armed Forces was heavily involved in the Algerian war, which made operations against Egypt a major distraction. French paratroopers of the elite Regiment de Parachutistes Coloniaux (RPC) were extremely experienced, battle-hardened, and very tough soldiers, who had greatly distinguished themselves in the fighting in Indochina and in Algeria. The men of the RPC followed a "shoot first, ask questions later" policy towards civilians, first adopted in Vietnam, which was to lead to the killing of a number of Egyptian civilians. The rest of the French troops were described by the American military historian Derek Varble as "competent, but not outstanding".

The main French (and Israeli) tank, the AMX-13, was lightly armoured but agile: designed for mobile, flanking operations. General André Beaufre, who served as Stockwell's subordinate, favoured a swift campaign of movement in which the main objective was to encircle the enemy. Throughout the operation, Beaufre proved himself to be more aggressive than his British counterparts, always urging that some bold step be taken at once. The French Navy had a powerful carrier force but, like its British counterpart, suffered from a lack of landing craft.

Israeli

An Israeli AMX-13, shown here from the rear and side

American military historian Derek Varble called the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) the "best" military force in the Middle East while at the same time suffering from "deficiencies" such as "immature doctrine, faulty logistics, and technical inadequacies". The IDF's Chief of Staff, Major General Moshe Dayan, encouraged aggression, initiative, and ingenuity among the Israeli officer corps while ignoring logistics and armoured operations. Dayan preferred infantry at the expense of armour.

The IDF had a rather disorganised logistics arm, which was put under severe strain when the IDF invaded the Sinai. The main IDF tank was the AMX-13 and the main aircraft were the Dassault Mystère IVA and the Ouragan. Superior pilot training gave the Israeli Air Force an edge over their Egyptian opponents. The Israeli Navy consisted of two destroyers, seven frigates, eight minesweepers, several landing craft, and fourteen torpedo boats.

Egyptian

In the Egyptian Armed Forces, politics rather than military competence was the main criterion for promotion. The Egyptian commander, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, was a heavy drinker who was close friends with Nasser and who would prove incompetent as a general during the Crisis. In 1956, the Egyptian military was well equipped with weapons from the Soviet Union such as T-34 and IS-3 tanks, MiG-15 fighters, Ilyushin Il-28 bombers, SU-100 self-propelled guns and assault rifles.

Rigid lines between officers and men in the Egyptian Army led to a mutual "mistrust and contempt" between officers and the men who served under them. Egyptian troops were excellent in defensive operations, but had little capacity for offensive operations, owing to the lack of "rapport and effective small-unit leadership".

Invasion of Egypt

Main article: Timeline of the Suez Crisis

Casualties

See also: Khan Yunis massacre

British casualties stood at 22 dead and 96 wounded, while French casualties were 10 dead and 33 wounded. The Israeli losses were 172 dead and 817 wounded. The number of Egyptians killed was "never reliably established". Egyptian casualties to the Israeli invasion were estimated at 1,000–3,000 dead and 4,000 wounded, while losses to the Anglo-French operation were estimated at 650 dead and 900 wounded. 1,000 Egyptian civilians are estimated to have died.

End of hostilities

Domestic British response

Newsreel from 12 November 1956 about the end of the invasion

Eden's obsession with secrecy meant that the government did nothing in the months running up to the attack to explain to the British people or the reservists called up for their National Service in the summer and fall of 1956 why the war was necessary. Only one British soldier, however, refused to fight.

According to some historians, the majority of British people were on Eden's side. According to public opinion polls at the time, 37% of the British people supported the war while 44% were opposed. On 10 and 11 November an opinion poll found 53% supported the war, with 32% opposed.

Although the public believed the British government's justification of the invasion as a separation of Israeli and Egyptian forces, protests against the war occurred in Britain after it began. On the popular television talk show Free Speech, an especially bitter debate took place on 31 October betwen the leftist historian A. J. P. Taylor, the Labour journalist and future party leader Michael Foot, and the Conservative MP Robert Boothby. The angry, passionate, much-watched debates about the Suez war on Free Speech mirrored the divided public response to the war. Stormy and violent debates in the House of Commons on 1 November 1956 almost degenerated into fist-fights after several Labour MPs compared Eden to Hitler. The British government pressured the BBC to support the war, and seriously considered taking over the network.

The majority of Conservative constituency associations passed resolutions of support to "Sir Anthony". The majority of letters written to MPs from their constituents were against the Suez attack. Significantly, many of the letters came from voters who identified as Conservatives.

The Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress organised nation-wide anti-war protests, starting on 1 November. On 4 November, at an anti-war rally in Trafalgar Square attended by 30,000 people (making it easily the biggest rally in London since 1945), the Labour MP Aneurin Bevan accused the government of "a policy of bankruptcy and despair". Inspired by Bevan's speech, the crowd at Trafalgar Square then marched on 10 Downing Street chanting "Eden Must Go!", and attempted to storm the Prime Minister's residence. The ensuing clashes between the police and the demonstrators which were captured by television cameras had a huge demoralising effect on the Eden cabinet, which was meeting there.

The conflict exposed the division within the Labour Party between its middle-class internationalist intelligentsia who opposed the conflict, and working-class voters who supported it. The Labour MP Richard Crossman said that "when the Labour Party leadership tried to organise demonstrations in the Provinces of the kind they'd held in Trafalgar Square, there was great reluctance among the working classes, because we were at war. It was Munich in reverse." Another Labour MP, Barbara Castle, recalled that Labour's protest against the conflict was "drowned in a wave of public jingoism".

The Suez Crisis played a key role in the reconciliation of the Gaitskellite and Bevanite factions of the Labour Party, which both condemned the invasion, after the 1955 leadership election.

On 2 November 1956 the First Sea Lord Admiral Mountbatten sent a letter to Eden telling him to stop the invasion before troops landed in the canal zone as the operation had already proved to be too costly politically. The next day, Mountbatten made a desperate phone call to Eden asking for permission to stop the invasion before it began, only to be refused.

International responses

Responses by Western governments

Eisenhower press conference about the crisis, 9 August

Along with the Suez crisis, the United States was also dealing with the near-simultaneous Hungarian revolution. Vice-President Richard Nixon later explained: "We couldn't on one hand, complain about the Soviets intervening in Hungary and, on the other hand, approve of the British and the French picking that particular time to intervene against Nasser". Eisenhower also believed that if the United States supported the attack on Egypt, that the resulting backlash in the Arab world might win the Arabs over to the Soviet Union.

Despite having no commercial or military interest in the area, many countries were concerned with the growing rift between Western allied nations.

When Israel refused to withdraw its troops from the Gaza Strip and Sharm el-Sheikh, Eisenhower sought UN-backed efforts to impose economic sanctions on Israel until it fully withdrew from Egyptian territory. The Democratic Party-controlled Senate would not co-operate with Eisenhower's position on Israel. Eisenhower finally told Congress he would take the issue to the American people, saying, "America has either one voice or none, and that voice is the voice of the President—whether everybody agrees with him or not," and spoke by radio and television to outline his position.

Responses in the Muslim world

The attack on Egypt greatly offended many in the Muslim world. In Pakistan, 300,000 people took part in a rally in Lahore to show solidarity with Egypt, and a violent mob in Karachi chanting anti-British slogans burned down the British High Commission. In Syria, the government blew up the Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline, which had allowed Iraqi oil to reach tankers in the Mediterranean, to punish Iraq for supporting the invasion and to cut Britain off from one of its main routes for taking delivery of Iraqi oil. King Saud of Saudi Arabia imposed a total oil embargo on Britain and France.

Responses elsewhere in Asia

China made strong statements in support of Egypt, condemned France and Britain, but avoided referring to Israel in its condemnations.

UN General Assembly Resolution 997

Presidents Eisenhower and Nasser meeting in New York, 1960

On 30 October, the Security Council submitted a draft resolution calling upon Israel immediately to withdraw its armed forces behind the established armistice lines. It was not adopted because of British and French vetoes. A similar draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union was also rejected. On 31 October, as planned, France and the UK launched their attacks against targets in Egypt. Later that day, the Security Council passed Resolution 119, calling an emergency special session of the General Assembly for the first time, in order to make appropriate recommendations to end the fighting.

Universal Newsreel from 4 December about Dag Hammarskjöld's meeting with Nasser

The emergency special session was convened on 1 November. The same day Nasser requested diplomatic assistance from the US, without requesting the same from the Soviet Union.

In the early hours of 2 November, the General Assembly adopted the United States' proposal for Resolution 997. It called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines, an arms embargo, and the reopening of the Suez Canal, which was now blocked. The vote was 64 in favour and 5 opposed (Australia, New Zealand, Britain, France, and Israel) with 6 abstentions.

Over the next several days, the emergency special session established the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). This proposal of the emergency force and the resulting cease-fire was made possible primarily through the efforts of Lester B. Pearson, the Secretary of External Affairs of Canada, and Dag Hammarskjöld, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Britain and France agreed to withdraw from Egypt within a week; Israel did not.

Condemnation of the UN in West Germany

A rare example of support for the Anglo-French actions against Egypt came from West Germany. Though his Cabinet was divided, West Germany's Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was furious with the United States for its "chumminess with the Russians". Adenauer told his Cabinet on 7 November that Nasser was a pro-Soviet force that needed to be cut down to size, and in his view the attack on Egypt was completely justified.Adenauer feared that the United States and Soviet Union would "carve up the world" according to their own interests. Because of this, Adenauer strengthened his relationship with Mollet and France.

Post-invasion Israeli initiatives

On 7 November, David Ben-Gurion addressed the Knesset and declared a great victory, saying that the 1949 armistice agreement with Egypt was dead and buried, and that the armistice lines were no longer valid and could not be restored. Under no circumstances would Israel agree to the stationing of UN forces on its territory or in any area it occupied. He also made an oblique reference to his intention to annex the Sinai Peninsula. Isaac Alteras writes that Ben-Gurion "was carried away by the resounding victory against Egypt" and while "a statesman well known for his sober realism, [he] took flight in dreams of grandeur".

The speech marked the beginning of a four-month-long diplomatic struggle, culminating in withdrawal from all territory, under conditions far less palatable than those envisioned in the speech, but with conditions for sea access to Eilat and a UNEF presence on Egyptian soil. The speech immediately drew increased international pressure on Israel to withdraw. That day in New York, the emergency session passed Resolution 1002, again calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops to behind the armistice lines, and for the immediate withdrawal of British and French troops from Egyptian territory. After a long Israeli cabinet meeting late on 8 November, Ben-Gurion informed Eisenhower that Israel declared its willingness to accept withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai, "when satisfactory arrangements are made with the international force that is about to enter the canal zone".

Soviet response

Premier Nikolai Bulganin threatened to intervene on the Egyptian side, and to launch rocket attacks on Britain, France and Israel. It was later learned that the Soviets did not have the ICBMs necessary to launch this attack, but the West did not know this at the time.

The Soviet threat to send troops to Egypt to fight the Allies led Eisenhower to fear that this might be the beginning of World War III. From Eisenhower's viewpoint, it was better to end the war against Egypt rather than run the risk of this escalating into the Third World War. Eisenhower immediately ordered Lockheed U-2 flights over Syria and Israel to search for any Soviet air forces on Syrian bases, so the British and French could destroy them. The Americans excluded Israel from the guarantee against Soviet attack, however, alarming the Israeli government. The U-2 showed that Soviet aircraft were not in Syria despite the threats.

Economic pressure on Britain and France

The United States put financial pressure on the UK to end the invasion. Because the Bank of England had lost $45 million between 30 October and 2 November, and Britain's oil supply had been restricted by the closing of the Suez Canal, the British sought immediate assistance from the IMF, but it was denied by the United States. In addition, Eisenhower ordered his Secretary of the Treasury, George M. Humphrey, to prepare to sell part of the US government's sterling bond holdings. The UK government considered invading Kuwait and Qatar if oil sanctions were put in place by the US.

Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, warned his Prime Minister that Britain's foreign exchange reserves simply could not sustain the devaluation of the pound that would come after the United States' actions; and that within weeks of such a move, the country would be unable to import sufficient food and energy supplies. However, there were suspicions in the Cabinet that Macmillan had deliberately overstated the financial situation in order to force Eden out. What Treasury officials had told Macmillan was far less serious than what he told the Cabinet.

In concert with US actions, Saudi Arabia started an oil embargo against Britain and France. The US refused to fill the gap until Britain and France agreed to a rapid withdrawal. Other NATO members refused to sell oil they received from Arab nations to Britain or France.

Ceasefire

Israelis protesting against the UN order to evacuate Gaza and Sinai, 14 February 1957

Anthony Eden announced a cease fire on 6 November, warning neither France nor Israel beforehand. Troops were still in Port Said and on operational manoeuvres. Port Said had been overrun, and the military assessment was that the Suez Canal could have been completely taken within 24 hours.

Eisenhower was not in favour of an immediate withdrawal of British, French and Israeli troops until the US ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. pushed for it. Without further guarantee, the Anglo-French Task Force had to finish withdrawing by 22 December 1956, to be replaced by Danish and Colombian units of the UNEF.

The Israelis refused to host any UN force on Israeli-controlled territory and withdrew from the Sinai and Gaza in March 1957. Before the withdrawal the Israeli forces systematically destroyed infrastructure in the Sinai peninsula such as roads, railways and telephone lines, and all houses in the villages of Abu Ageila and El Quseima. Israeli troops confiscated Egyptian National Railways equipment for use by Israel Railways.

The UNEF was formed by forces from countries that were not part of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Canadian Armed Forces troops participated in later years, since Canada had spearheaded the idea of a neutral force. By 24 April 1957, the canal was fully reopened to shipping.

Aftermath

1957 newsreels about the aftermath of the crisis

The conflict resulted in a military victory for the Coalition, but a political victory for Egypt. Egypt maintained control of the canal.

In retirement, Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister at the time, maintained that the military response had prevented a much larger war in the Middle East. In the context of the massive armament of Egypt via Czechoslovakia, Israel had been expecting an Egyptian invasion in either March or April 1957, as well as a Soviet invasion of Syria. The crisis may also have hastened decolonisation, as many of the remaining British and French colonies gained independence over the next few years. Some argued that the imposed ending to the Crisis led to over-hasty decolonisation in Africa, increasing the chance of civil wars and military dictatorships in newly independent countries.

The fight over the canal also laid the groundwork for the Six-Day War in 1967 due to the lack of a peace settlement following the 1956 war and rising of tensions between Egypt and Israel. Additionally, the Soviet Union was able to avoid most repercussions from its concurrent violent suppression of the rebellion in Hungary, and were able to present an image at the United Nations as a defender of small powers against imperialism.

As a direct result of the Crisis and in order to prevent further Soviet expansion in the region, Eisenhower asked Congress on 5 January 1957 for authorisation to use military force if requested by any Middle Eastern nation to check aggression and, secondly, to set aside $200 million to help Middle Eastern countries that desired aid from the United States. Congress granted both requests and this policy became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The Soviet Union made major gains with regards to influence in the Middle East. As American historian John Lewis Gaddis wrote:

When the British-French-Israeli invasion forced them to choose, Eisenhower and Dulles came down, with instant decisiveness, on the side of the Egyptians. They preferred alignment with Arab nationalism, even if it meant alienating pro-Israeli constituencies on the eve of a presidential election in the United States, even if it meant throwing the NATO alliance into its most divisive crisis yet, even if it meant risking whatever was left of the Anglo-American 'special relationship', even if it meant voting with the Soviet Union in the United Nations Security Council at a time when the Russians, themselves, were invading Hungary and crushing—far more brutally than anything that happened in Egypt—a rebellion against their own authority there. The fact that the Eisenhower administration itself applied crushing economic pressure to the British and French to disengage from Suez, and that it subsequently forced an Israeli pull-back from the Sinai as well—all of this, one might thought, would win the United States the lasting gratitude of Nasser, the Egyptians and the Arab world. Instead, the Americans lost influence in the Middle East as a result of Suez, while the Russians gained it.

Statue of Ferdinand de Lesseps, a Frenchman who was lead developer in the construction of the Suez Canal, being removed following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956.

Nikita Khrushchev's much publicised threat expressed through letters written by Nikolai Bulganin to begin rocket attacks on 5 November on Britain, France, and Israel if they did not withdraw from Egypt was widely believed at the time to have forced a ceasefire. Accordingly, it enhanced the prestige of the Soviet Union in Egypt, the Arab world, and the Third World, who believed the USSR was prepared to launch a nuclear attack on Britain, France, and Israel for the sake of Egypt. Though Nasser in private admitted that it was American economic pressure that had saved him, it was Khrushchev, not Eisenhower, whom Nasser publicly thanked as Egypt's saviour and special friend. Khrushchev boasted in his memoirs:

Our use of international influence to halt England, France and Israel's aggression against Egypt in 1956 was a historic turning point...Previously they had apparently thought that we were bluffing, when we openly said that the Soviet Union possessed powerful rockets. But then they saw that we really had rockets. And this had its effect.

Khrushchev took the view that the Suez crisis had been a great triumph for Soviet nuclear brinkmanship, arguing publicly and privately that his threat to use nuclear weapons was what had saved Egypt. Khrushchev claimed in his memoirs:

The governments of England and France knew perfectly well that Eisenhower's speech condemning their aggression was just a gesture for the sake of public appearances. But when we delivered our own stern warning to the three aggressors, they knew we weren't playing games with public opinion. They took us seriously.

The conclusion that Khrushchev drew from the Suez crisis, which he saw as his own personal triumph, was that the use of nuclear blackmail was a very effective tool for achieving Soviet foreign policy goals. Therefore, a long period of crises began, starting with the Berlin crisis, beginning later in November 1958, and culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles perceived a power vacuum in the Middle East, and he thought the United States should fill it. His policies, which ultimately led to the Eisenhower Doctrine, were based on the assumption that Nasser and other Arab leaders shared America's fear of the Soviet Union, which was emphatically not the case. In fact, Nasser never wanted Egypt to be aligned with one single superpower, and instead preferred the Americans and Soviets vying for his friendship.

Nasser saw the Eisenhower Doctrine as a heavy-handed American attempt to dominate the Middle East (a region that Nasser believed he ought to dominate), and led him to ally Egypt with the Soviet Union as an effective counter-weight. It was only with the quiet abandonment of the Eisenhower Doctrine in a National Security Council review in mid-1958 that Nasser started pulling away from the Soviet Union to resume his preferred role as an opportunist who tried to use both superpowers to his advantage, playing on their animosity.

The American historian Arthur L. Herman said that the episode ruined the usefulness of the United Nations to support American geopolitical aims.

Military thought

The great military lesson that was reinforced by the Suez War was the extent that the desert favoured highly fluid, mobile operations and the power of aerial interdiction. French aircraft destroyed Egyptian forces threatening paratroopers at Raswa and Israeli air power saved the IDF several days' worth of time. To operate in the open desert without air supremacy proved to be suicidal for the Egyptian forces in the Sinai. The Royal Marine helicopter assault at Port Said "showed promise as a technique for transporting troops into small landing zones". Strategic bombing proved ineffective.

Revise Phase II failed to achieve its aim of breaking Egyptian morale while at the same time, those civilian deaths that did occur helped to turn world opinion against the invasion and especially hurt support for the war in Britain. Egyptian urban warfare tactics at Port Said proved to be effective at slowing down the Allied advance. Finally, the war showed the importance of diplomacy. Anglo-French operations against Egypt were militarily successful, but proved to be counterproductive as opinion in both the home front in Britain and France and the world abroad, especially in the United States, was against the operation.

Europe

In West Germany, the Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was shocked by the Soviet threat of nuclear strikes against Britain and France, and even more by the quiescent American response to the Soviet threat of nuclear annihilation against two of NATO's key members. The Bulganin letters showcased Europe's dependence upon the United States for security against Soviet nuclear threats while at the same time seeming to show that the American nuclear umbrella was not as reliable as had been advertised.

As a result, the French became determined to acquire their own nuclear weapons rather than rely upon the Americans, while Germany became even more interested in the idea of a European "Third Force" in the Cold War. This helped to lead to the formation of the European Economic Community under the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which was intended to be the foundation of the European "Third Force". The European Economic Community was the precursor to the European Union.

Egypt

Presidents Shukri al-Quwatli (left) and Gamal Abdel Nasser (right) clasp hands in front of jubilant crowds in Damascus days after the union of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic, 1958

With the prompt withdrawal of UK and French troops, later followed by Israeli troop withdraw, Egypt kept control of the Suez Canal. After the fighting ended, the Egyptian Chief-of-Staff Abdel Hakim Amer accused Nasser of provoking an unnecessary war and then blaming the military for the result. The British historian D. R. Thorpe wrote that the outcome gave Nasser "an inflated view of his own power", thinking he had overcome the combined forces of the United Kingdom, France and Israel, failing to attribute their withdrawal to pressure from the superpowers.

Nasser emerged a hero in the Arab world. American historian Derek Varble commented, "Although Egyptian forces fought with mediocre skill during the conflict, many Arabs saw Nasser as the conqueror of European colonialism and Zionism, simply because Britain, France and Israel left the Sinai and the northern Canal Zone." The historian Andrew McGregor argued that the retreat from Sinai was not a complete rout, since it preserved most of the regular army for fighting the larger enemy—Britain and France. Historian P. J. Vatikiotis described Nasser's speeches in 1956 and after as providing "superficial explanations of Egypt's military collapse in Sinai, based on some extraordinary strategy" and that "simplistic children's tales about the Egyptian air force's prowess in 1956 were linked in the myth of orderly withdrawal from Sinai. All this was necessary to construct yet another myth, that of Port Said. Inflating and magnifying odd and sporadic resistance into a Stalingrad-like tenacious defense, Port Said became the spirit of Egyptian independence and dignity."

During the Nasser era, the fighting at Port Said became a symbol of Egyptian victory, linked to a global anti-colonial struggle. Of Nasser's post-Suez hubris, Thorpe wrote, "The Six-Day War against Israel in 1967 was when reality kicked in—a war that would never have taken place if the Suez crisis had had a different resolution." Of Tawfiq al-Hakim's writings about the 1956 and 1967 wars, Vatikiotis summarises: "Were bluffing and histrionics in the nature of Nasser? It was bluffing that led to the crushing of Egypt in 1967, because of the mass self-deception exercised by leaders and followers alike ever since the non-existent 'Stalingrad which was Port Said' in 1956."

Crackdown on Egyptian Jews

Further information: 1956–1957 exodus and expulsions from Egypt and Jewish exodus from the Muslim world § Egypt

In October 1956, when the Suez Crisis erupted, Nasser brought in a set of sweeping regulations abolishing civil liberties and allowing the state to stage mass arrests without charge and strip away Egyptian citizenship from any group it desired; these measures were mostly directed against the Jews of Egypt. As part of its new policy, 1,000 Jews were arrested and 500 Jewish businesses were seized by the government.

A statement branding the Jews as "Zionists and enemies of the state" was read out in the mosques of Cairo and Alexandria. Jewish bank accounts were confiscated and many Jews lost their jobs. Lawyers, engineers, doctors and teachers were not allowed to work in their professions. Thousands of Jews were ordered to leave the country.

They were allowed to take only one suitcase and a small sum of cash, and forced to sign declarations "donating" their property to the Egyptian government. Some 25,000 Jews, almost half of the Jewish community, left Egypt, mainly for Israel, Europe, the United States and South America. By 1957, the Jewish population of Egypt had fallen to 15,000.

Britain

Nasser and Harold Macmillan, 1960

The political and psychological impact of the crisis had a fundamental impact on British politics. Anthony Eden was accused of misleading parliament and resigned from office on 9 January 1957. Eden had been prime minister for less than two years when he resigned, and his unsuccessful handling of the Suez Crisis eclipsed the successes he had achieved in the previous 30 years as foreign secretary in three Conservative governments.

Eden's successor, Harold Macmillan, accelerated the process of decolonisation and sought to restore Britain's special relationship with the United States. He enjoyed a close friendship with Eisenhower, dating from the North African campaign in World War II, where General Eisenhower commanded allied invasion forces and Macmillan provided political liaison with Winston Churchill. Benefiting from his personal popularity and a healthy economy, Macmillan's government increased its Parliamentary majority in the 1959 general election.

The Suez crisis, though a blow to British power in the Near East, did not mark its end. Britain intervened successfully in Jordan to put down riots that threatened the rule of King Hussein in 1958 and in 1961 deployed troops to Kuwait to successfully deter an Iraqi invasion. The latter deployment had been a response to the threats of the Iraqi dictator General Abd al-Karim Qasim that he would invade and annex Kuwait. At the same time, though British influence continued in the Middle East, Suez was a blow to British prestige in the Near East from which the country never recovered. Britain evacuated all positions East of Suez by 1971, though this was due mainly to economic factors.

Increasingly, British foreign policy thinking turned away from acting as a great imperial power. During the 1960s there was much speculation that Prime Minister Harold Wilson's continued refusals to send British troops to the Vietnam War, even as a token force, despite President Lyndon B. Johnson's persistent requests, were partially due to the Americans not supporting Britain during the Suez Crisis. Edward Heath was dismayed by the US opposition to Britain during the Suez Crisis; as Prime Minister in October 1973 he refused the US permission to use any of the UK's air bases to resupply during the Yom Kippur War, or to allow the Americans to gather intelligence from British bases in Cyprus.

However, the British relationship with the United States did not suffer lasting consequences from the crisis. "The Anglo-American 'special relationship' was revitalised immediately after the Suez Crisis", writes Risse Kappen. The United States wanted to restore the prestige of its closest ally and thus "The two governments...engaged in almost ritualistic reassurances that their 'special relationship' would be restored quickly". One example came with Britain's first hydrogen bomb test Operation Grapple which led to the 1958 US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement. Six years after the crisis, the Americans amazed the British by selling them state-of-the-art missile technology at a moderate cost, which became the UK Polaris programme.

The war led to the eviction of GCHQ from several of its best foreign signals intelligence collection sites, including the new Perkar, Ceylon site, recently developed at a cost of £2 million, equivalent to £66 million in 2023, and RAF Habbaniya, Iraq.

France

Risse-Kappen argued that Franco-American ties never recovered from the Suez crisis. There were various reasons for this. Previously there had already been strains in the Franco-American relationship triggered by what Paris considered US betrayal of the French war effort in Indochina at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. According to Risse-Kappen, this incident demonstrated the weakness of the NATO alliance by not planning and co-operating beyond the European stage. Mollet believed Eden should have delayed calling the Cabinet together until 7 November, taking the whole canal in the meantime, and then veto with the French any UN resolution on sanctions.

From the point of view of General Charles de Gaulle, the Suez events demonstrated to France that it could not rely on its allies. The British had initiated a ceasefire in the midst of the battle without consulting the French, while the Americans had opposed Paris politically. The damage to the ties between Paris and Washington, D.C., "culminated in President de Gaulle's 1966 decision to withdraw from the military integration of NATO".

The Suez war had an immense impact on French domestic politics. Much of the French Army officer corps felt that they had been "betrayed" by what they considered to be the spineless politicians in Paris when they were on the verge of victory, just as they believed they had been "betrayed" in Vietnam in 1954, and accordingly became more determined to win the war in Algeria, even if it meant overthrowing the Fourth Republic to do so. The Suez crisis thus helped to set the stage for the military disillusionment with the Fourth Republic, which was to lead to the collapse of the republic in 1958. According to the protocol of Sèvres agreements, France secretly transmitted parts of its own atomic technology to Israel, including a detonator.

Israel

An Israeli soldier stands next to an Egyptian gun that had blocked the Tiran Straits.

The Israel Defense Forces gained confidence from the campaign. The war demonstrated that Israel was capable of executing large scale military manoeuvres in addition to small night-time raids and counter-insurgency operations. David Ben-Gurion, reading on 16 November that 90,000 British and French troops had been involved in the Suez affair, wrote in his diary, 'If they had only appointed a commander of ours over this force, Nasser would have been destroyed in two days.'

The war also had tangible benefits for Israel. The Straits of Tiran, closed by Egypt since 1950, were re-opened. Israeli shipping could henceforth move freely through the Straits of Tiran to and from Africa and Asia. The Israelis also secured the presence of UN Peacekeepers in Sinai. Operation Kadesh bought Israel an eleven-year lull on its southern border with Egypt.

Israel escaped the political humiliation that befell Britain and France following their swift, forced withdrawal. In addition, its stubborn refusal to withdraw without guarantees, even in defiance of the United States and United Nations, ended all Western efforts, mainly American and British ones, to impose a political settlement in the Middle East without taking Israel's security needs into consideration.

In October 1965 Eisenhower told Jewish fundraiser and Republican party supporter Max M. Fisher that he greatly regretted forcing Israel to withdraw from the Sinai peninsula; Vice President Nixon recalled that Eisenhower expressed the same view to him on several occasions.

Canada

Lester B. Pearson, who would later become the Prime Minister of Canada, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his efforts in creating a mandate for a United Nations Peacekeeping Force, and he is considered the father of the modern concept of peacekeeping. The Suez Crisis contributed to the adoption of a new national flag of Canada in 1965, as the Egyptian government had objected to Canadian peacekeeping troops on the grounds that their flag at that time included a British ensign.

Soviet Union

The Soviet Union, once outside what was considered a Western sphere of influence, was now a friend of the Arabs. Shortly after it reopened, the canal was traversed by the first Soviet Navy warships since World War I. The Soviets' burgeoning influence in the Middle East, although it was not to last, included acquiring Mediterranean bases, introducing multipurpose projects, supporting the budding Palestinian liberation movement and penetrating the Arab countries.

See also

• 1956 riots in Iraq
• Closure of the Suez Canal (1967–1975)
• Egyptian National Military Museum 1956 war hall
• Operation Tarnegol
• Protocol of Sèvres

General

• France–United Kingdom relations
• France–United States relations
• Israel–United States relations
• Israeli casualties of war
• List of modern conflicts in the Middle East
• United Kingdom–United States relations

References

Works cited

• Adamthwaite, Anthony (1988). "Suez revisited". International Affairs. 64 (3): 449–464. doi:10.2307/2622851. ISSN 1468-2346. JSTOR 2622851.
• Alteras, Isaac (1993). Eisenhower and Israel: U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1953–1960. University Press of Florida. ISBN 978-0-8130-1206-3.
• Barnett, Michael N. (1992). Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-6910-7883-0.
• Bromberger, Merry and Serge Secrets of Suez Sidgwick & Jackson London 1957 (translated from French Les Secrets de l'Expedition d'Egypte by James Cameron)
• Burns, William J. (1985). Economic Aid and American Policy toward Egypt, 1955–1981. Albany: State University of New York Press. ISBN 978-0-8739-5868-4.
• Butler, L. J. (2002). Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World. London: I.B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1-8606-4449-8.
• Darwin, John (1988). Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat From Empire in the Post-War World. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-3332-9258-7.
• Dietl, Ralph (April 2008). "Suez 1956: A European Intervention?". Journal of Contemporary History. 43 (2): 259–273. doi:10.1177/0022009408089032. S2CID 159816012.
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• James, Robert Rhodes (1986). Anthony Eden: A Biography. McGraw Hill Book Company Inc. ASIN B0040YOVBQ.
• Kingseed, Cole Christian (1995). Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956. Louisiana State Press. ISBN 978-0-8071-1987-7.
• Kissinger, Henry (1994). Diplomacy. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-0-6715-1099-2.
• Kyle, Keith (2003). Suez: Britain's End of Empire in the Middle East. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1-8606-4811-3.
• Laskier, Michael M. (1995). "Egyptian Jewry under the Nasser Regime, 1956–70". Middle Eastern Studies. 31 (3): 573–619. doi:10.1080/00263209508701070. JSTOR 4283743.
• Love, Kenneth (1969). Suez The Twice Fought War. McGraw-Hill.
• Neff, Donald (1981). Warriors at Suez : Eisenhower takes America into the Middle-East. New York: Simon and Schuster. ISBN 978-0-6714-1010-0.
• Pearson, Jonathan. (2002) Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble (Springer, 2002). online
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• Sayed-Ahmed, Muhammad Add al-Wahab (1993). "Relations between Egypt and the United States of America in the 1950s". In Tripp, Charles (ed.). Contemporary Egypt: Through Egyptian Eyes : Essays in Honour of Professor P.J. Vatikiotis. Routledge. pp. 89–99. ISBN 978-0-4150-6103-2.
• Sachar, Howard Morley (1996). A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. A.A. Knopf. ISBN 978-0-6797-6563-9.
• Schiff, Zeev (1974). A History of the Israeli Army: 1870–1974. Straight Arrow Books. ISBN 978-0-8793-2077-5. OCLC 1188936. OL 5068460M.
• Shlaim, Avi. "The Protocol of Sevres, 1956: Anatomy of a War Plot." International Affairs 73#3 1997, pp. 509–530. online.
• Smith, Simon C. ed. Reassessing Suez 1956: New perspectives on the crisis and its aftermath (Routledge, 2016).
• Stewart, Dona J. (2013). The Middle East Today: Political, Geographical and Cultural Perspectives. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-4157-8243-2.
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• Turner, Barry (2006). Suez 1956 The World's First War for Oil. London: Hodder & Stoughton. ISBN 978-0-3408-3768-9.
• Troen, S. Ilan. "The Protocol of Sèvres: British/French/Israeli Collusion Against Egypt, 1956." Israel Studies 1.2 (1996): 122-139 online.
• Varble, Derek (2003). The Suez Crisis 1956. London: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-8417-6418-4.
• Vatikiotis, Panayiotis (1978). Nasser and His Generation. London: Croom Helm. ISBN 978-0-8566-4433-7.
• Wilson, Andrew (2008). Our Times The age of Elizabeth II. London: Hutchinson. ISBN 978-0-0917-9671-6.
• Yergin, Daniel (1991). The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. New York City: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-0-6715-0248-5.. Chapter 24 is devoted entirely to the Suez Crisis.

Further reading

• Arnstein, Walter L. (2001). Britain Yesterday and Today: 1830 to the Present. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. ISBN 978-0-6180-0104-0.
• Beaufre, André (1969). The Suez Expedition 1956. New York: Praeger. ISBN 978-0-5710-8979-6. (translated from French by Richard Barry)
• Bregman, Ahron (2002). Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-4152-8716-6.
• Childers, Erskine B. (1962). The Road To Suez. MacGibbon & Kee. ASIN B000H47WG4.
• Heikal, Mohamed (1986). Cutting The Lion's Tail: Suez Through Egyptian eyes. London: Deutsch. ISBN 978-0-2339-7967-0.
• Hyam, Ronald (2006). Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation 1918–1969. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-5216-8555-9.
• Karabell, Zachary (2003). Parting the desert: the creation of the Suez Canal. Alfred A. Knopf. ISBN 0-375-40883-5.
• Kunz, Diane B. (1991). The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis. U. of North Carolina Press. ISBN 978-0-8078-1967-8.
• Lahav, Pnina (July 2015). "The Suez Crisis of 1956 and Its Aftermath: A Comparative Study of Constitutions, Use of Force, Diplomacy and International Relations". Boston University Law Review. 95: 1297–1354. ISSN 0006-8047.
• Leuliette, Pierre (1964). St. Michael and the Dragon: Memoirs of a Paratrooper. Houghton Mifflin.
• Lucas, Scott (1996). Britain and Suez: The Lion's Last Roar. Manchester University Press. pp. 118–130. ISBN 978-0-7190-4579-0. pp. 118–130 on historiography
• Marshall, S. L. A. (1958). Sinai Victory: Command Decisions in History's Shortest War, Israel's Hundred-Hour Conquest of Egypt East of Suez, Autumn, 1956. New York: Battery Press. ISBN 978-0-8983-9085-8. {{cite book}}: ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)
• McGregor, Andrew (2006). A Military History of Modern Egypt: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Ramadan War. Praeger. ISBN 978-0275986018.
• Painter, David S. (2012). "Oil and the American Century". The Journal of American History. 99 (1): 24–39. doi:10.1093/jahist/jas073.
• Reynolds, David (1991). Brittania Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century. Longman. ISBN 978-0-5823-8249-7.
• Sharon, Ariel (1989). Warrior: The Autobiography of Ariel Sharon. New York: Simon and Schuster. ISBN 978-0-6716-0555-1.
• Verbeek, Bertjan (2003). Decision-Making in Great Britain During the Suez Crisis: Small Groups and a Persistent Leader. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing. ISBN 978-0-7546-3253-5.

External links

• Israel's Second War of Independence, essay in Azure magazine.
• A Man, A Plan and A Canal by Arthur L. Herman
• Sinai Campaign 1956
• Canada and the Suez Crisis
• July 2006, BBC, Suez 50 years on
• Suez and the high tide of Arab nationalism International Socialism 112 (2006)
• Detailed report on the Suez campaign by Ground Forces Chief of Staff General Beaufre, French Defense Ministry archive (French)
• Bodleian Library Suez Crisis Fiftieth anniversary exhibition Archived 21 February 2017 at the Wayback Machine
• Suez index at Britains-smallwars.com—accounts by British servicemen who were present
• 26 July speech by Gamal Abdel Nasser (French translation)
• Speech by Gamal Abdel Nasser Archived 11 March 2012 at the Wayback Machine (Original text in Arabic)
• The short film The Middle East (1963) is available for free viewing and download at the Internet Archive.

Media links

• Newsreel film, British Prime Minister's broadcast Archived 7 January 2012 at the Wayback Machine at Britishpathe.com
• Blue Vanguard (1957), National Film Board of Canada film for the United Nations about its role in restoring peace after the Suez Crisis (60 min, Ian MacNeill, dir.)