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Draft:Political Polarization in Europe

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Political polarization is an increasingly prominent feature of politics in Europe.[1] Scholars differentiate between ideological polarization (divergences in policy positions) and affective polarization (emotional dislike and distrust of opposing political groups), both of which have intensified across the continent.[2][3] In the 21st century, Europe has seen a surge in polarization comparable to but distinct from that in other democracies, driven by multi-party systems and regional variations.[4][5] This rise contrasts with post-World War II stability, where consensus on welfare states and integration tempered divides.[6] Differences in political ideals and policy goals are indicative of a healthy democracy.[7] Scholarly questions consider changes in the magnitude of political polarization over time, the extent to which polarization is a feature of European politics and society,[8] and whether there has been a shift away from focusing on triumphs to dominating the perceived abhorrent supporters of the opposing party.[7] Polarization has increased since the 1970s, with rapid increases in polarization during the 2000s onwards.[9] According to the Pew Research Center, members of both parties who have unfavorable opinions of the opposing party have doubled since 1994,[10] while those who have very unfavorable opinions of the opposing party are at record highs as of 2022.[11]

Definition and conceptualization

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The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute defines political polarization in Europe as "the vast and growing gap between liberals and conservatives, left and right parties".[12] According to psychology professors Gordon Heltzel and Kristin Laurin, political polarization occurs when "subsets of a population adopt increasingly dissimilar attitudes toward parties and party members (i.e., affective polarization), as well as ideologies and policies (ideological polarization.)"[13] Polarization has been defined as both a process and a state of being. A defining aspect of polarization, though not its only facet, is a bimodal distribution around conflicting points of view or philosophies. In general, defining a threshold at which an issue is "polarized" is imprecise; detecting the trend of polarization, however, (increasing, decreasing, or stable) is more straightforward.[14] The relationship between ideological and affective polarization is complicated and contested but, generally speaking, scholars recognize an increase in both ideological and affective polarization in Europe over time.[15] Some research suggests that affective polarization is growing more rapidly than ideological polarization[16] and perhaps even driving it.[4][17] Political scientists debate the relationship between elite-driven polarization and mass polarization (among the general public). Morris Fiorina argues that the European public is not as polarized as is often assumed, suggesting that elite polarization is wrongly imputed to the general public.[18] Conversely, Alan Abramowitz argues that mass polarization is actually imposing polarization upon elites through the electoral process.[19] Affective polarization is closely related to political tribalism and "us-them" thinking. There is mounting psychological evidence that humans are hardwired to display loyalty towards in-groups and hostility and distrust towards out-groups, however they are defined.[20] One way to describe this is to say that humans evolved to be partial empathizers, ready to empathize with those from whom they can expect reciprocity, while being incredibly skeptical towards outsiders.[21] Recent research has shown that the interplay between out-group hostility and in-group empathy can in fact be the driver of ideological polarization.[4] Indeed, many of our cognitive biases and failures of reason can be traced directly back to our apparent need to defend our group against threats, even when those threats consist mainly of ideas and words.[22] Motivated reasoning and confirmation bias (or myside bias) help to explain the cognitive blindspots that lead us to dismiss or discredit challenging information while granting unwarranted credence to information that supports our pre-existing views.[23][24][25] For example, in one study, subjects were asked to evaluate "neutral" quantitative data regarding the efficacy of skin cream. In this treatment, subjects' performance was determined simply by their numeracy, that is, their mathematical skill level. In a second treatment, however, subjects were presented with data concerning the efficacy of gun control laws. Partisans performed much more poorly when asked to evaluate data that challenged their pre-existing views about gun control laws; moreover, high mathematical skill levels did not prevent this. In fact, those who had the strongest mathematical skills were best able to rationalize a false interpretation of the data that conformed with their pre-existing views.[26] Similarly, Europeans' views on immigration seem to stem almost entirely from their cultural worldview and how they position themselves in that cultural schema; statistics do not persuade them to change their minds.[27] In fact, cognitive scientists Mercier and Sperber argue that human reason did not evolve in order to produce logical arguments, but rather to finesse social relationships. On this view, the evolutionary purpose of reason is not truth but rather persuasion and collaboration.[28] These studies suggest that our social and partisan identities (often discussed in the context of identity politics) affect the ways in which we engage information and may sometimes drive political polarization.[29] Although most studies have focussed on survey data to quantify affective polarization, social media and social network based approaches have recently been proposed to estimate the affective polarization.[30][31]

History

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Post-World War II period

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Main article: History of Europe § Post-war Europe

Following World War II, Europe experienced relative depolarization as societies rebuilt under a broad consensus on welfare states, democratic norms, and European integration.[32] The Cold War further encouraged centrist politics in Western Europe, while Eastern Europe under Soviet influence saw suppressed ideological divides.

1990s and 2000s

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See also: Fifth Party System

The 1990s and 2000s marked the beginning of increased polarization, triggered by the fall of communism, EU enlargement, and globalization. Economic disparities grew, leading to the rise of Eurosceptic and nationalist movements.[33]

2010s–present

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See also: Sixth Party System

Polarization accelerated post-2008 financial crisis and 2015 migration crisis. Populist leaders like Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Matteo Salvini in Italy used polarizing tactics to gain power.[34] In 2025, the assassination of US conservative activist Charlie Kirk highlighted transatlantic spillover, with the European Parliament's refusal of a tribute exposing deep ideological divides.[35][36]

Politically polarizing issues

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As of October 2025, key issues include immigration, EU integration, and cultural identity. Populism has amplified divides, with right-wing parties facing strong antipathy.[37] The 2025 Kirk assassination debates underscored polarization on free speech and violence.

Potential causes

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Elite-driven polarization

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Elites use asymmetric tactics, as seen in populist strategies in Hungary and Poland.[38]

Economic inequality and cultural issues

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Inequality and migration fuel divides, with populists exploiting "us vs. them" narratives.[39]

Effects

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Political violence

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The 2025 Kirk assassination and EP tribute denial exemplify rising violence and divides.[40]

Democratic backsliding

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Polarization contributes to erosion in Eastern Europe.[41]

Proposed solutions

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Reforms include proportional representation and intergroup dialogue to reduce divides.[42]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ Heltzel, Gordon; Laurin, Kristin (August 2020). "Polarization in America: two possible futures". Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences. 34: 179–184. doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.03.008. ISSN 2352-1546. PMC 7201237. PMID 32391408.
  2. ^ Iyengar, Shanto; Lelkes, Yphtach; Levendusky, Matthew; Malhotra, Neil; Westwood, Sean J. (2019). "The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States". Annual Review of Political Science. 22 (1): 129–146. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034. ISSN 1094-2939. S2CID 102523958.
  3. ^ Iyengar, Shanto (2022), Sibley, Chris G.; Osborne, Danny (eds.), "Fear and Loathing in American Politics: A Review of Affective Polarisation", The Cambridge Handbook of Political Psychology, Cambridge University Press, pp. 399–413, ISBN 978-1-108-48963-8
  4. ^ a b c Nettasinghe, Buddhika; Percus, Allon G; Lerman, Kristina (1 March 2025). "How out-group animosity can shape partisan divisions: A model of affective polarization". PNAS Nexus. 4 (3) pgaf082. arXiv:2403.16940. doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf082. ISSN 2752-6542. PMC 11927084. PMID 40125444.
  5. ^ Finkel, Eli J.; Bail, Christopher A.; Cikara, Mina; Ditto, Peter H.; Iyengar, Shanto; Klar, Samara; Mason, Lilliana; McGrath, Mary C.; Nyhan, Brendan; Rand, David G.; Skitka, Linda J.; Tucker, Joshua A.; Van Bavel, Jay J.; Wang, Cynthia S.; Druckman, James N. (30 October 2020). "Political sectarianism in America". Science. 370 (6516): 533–536. doi:10.1126/science.abe1715. ISSN 0036-8075. PMID 33122374.
  6. ^ Boxell, Levi; Gentzkow, Matthew; Shapiro, Jesse M. (2022). "Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization". The Review of Economics and Statistics. 106 (2): 557–565. doi:10.1162/rest_a_01160. ISSN 0034-6535. S2CID 246583807.
  7. ^ a b Finkel, Eli J.; Bail, Christopher A.; Cikara, Mina; Ditto, Peter H.; Iyengar, Shanto; Klar, Samara; Mason, Lilliana; McGrath, Mary C.; Nyhan, Brendan; Rand, David G.; Skitka, Linda J. (30 October 2020). "Political sectarianism in America". Science. 370 (6516): 533–536. doi:10.1126/science.abe1715. ISSN 0036-8075. PMID 33122374.
  8. ^ Pierson, Paul; Schickler, Eric (2020). "Madison's Constitution Under Stress: A Developmental Analysis of Political Polarization". Annual Review of Political Science. 23: 37–58. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-033629.
  9. ^ Grumbach, Jacob M. (2018). "From Backwaters to Major Policymakers: Policy Polarization in the States, 1970–2014". Perspectives on Politics. 16 (2): 416–435. doi:10.1017/S153759271700425X. ISSN 1537-5927.
  10. ^ Doherty, Carroll (17 June 2014). "Which party is more to blame for political polarization? It depends on the measure". Pew Research Center. Retrieved 14 August 2022.
  11. ^ "How Democrats and Republicans see each other". The Economist. 17 August 2022. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved 18 August 2022.
  12. ^ "Political Polarization". 19 March 2024.
  13. ^ Heltzel, Gordon; Laurin, Kristin (August 2020). "Polarization in America: two possible futures". Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences. 34: 179–184. doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.03.008. ISSN 2352-1546. PMC 7201237. PMID 32391408.
  14. ^ Fiorina, Morris P.; Abrams, Samuel J. (2008). "Political Polarization in the American Public". Annual Review of Political Science. 11: 563–588. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053106.153836.
  15. ^ Iyengar, Shanto; Lelkes, Yphtach; Levendusky, Matthew; Malhotra, Neil; Westwood, Sean J. (11 May 2019). "The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States". Annual Review of Political Science. 22 (1): 129–146. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034. ISSN 1094-2939.
  16. ^ Druckman, James N.; Klar, Samara; Krupnikov, Yanna; Levendusky, Matthew; Ryan, John Barry (23 November 2020). "Affective polarization, local contexts and public opinion in America". Nature Human Behaviour. 5 (1): 28–38. doi:10.1038/s41562-020-01012-5. ISSN 2397-3374. PMID 33230283.
  17. ^ Harteveld, Eelco (2021). "Ticking all the boxes? A comparative study of social sorting and affective polarization". Electoral Studies. 72 102337. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102337. hdl:11245.1/07733c04-cf72-443e-9d05-098027eebacb.
  18. ^ Fiorina, Morris; Abrams, Samuel J.; Pope, Jeremy C. (2010). Culture War? The Myth of American Polarization. Longman, 3rd edition.
  19. ^ Abramowitz, Alan (2012). The Polarized Public: Why American Government is so Dysfunctional. Pearson.
  20. ^ Sapolsky, Robert. "This is Your Brain on Nationalism: The Biology of Us vs. Them". Foreign Affairs (2004): 42–47.
  21. ^ Jencks, Christopher (1990). "Varieties of Alturism". In Mansbridge, Jane (ed.). Beyond Self Interest. University of Chicago Press. pp. 53–67.
  22. ^ "Deep polarization in reactions to Ford-Kavanaugh hearings". YouGov. Retrieved 18 June 2024.
  23. ^ Hastorf, Albert H.; Cantril, Hadley (1954). "They saw a game; a case study". The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 49 (1): 129–134. doi:10.1037/h0057880. ISSN 0096-851X. PMID 13128974.
  24. ^ "Blindspot: hidden biases of good people". Choice Reviews Online. 51 (10): 51–5867-51-5867. 22 May 2014. doi:10.5860/choice.51-5867 (inactive 1 July 2025). ISSN 0009-4978.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of July 2025 (link)
  25. ^ Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Macmillan.
  26. ^ Kahan, Dan M.; Peters, Ellen; Dawson, Erica Cantrell; Slovic, Paul (2017). "Motivated numeracy and enlightened self-government". Behavioural Public Policy. 1 (1): 54–86. doi:10.1017/bpp.2016.2. hdl:1794/18962. ISSN 2398-063X.
  27. ^ Kahan, Dan M.; Braman, Donald (2004). "More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions". University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 151 (4): 1291. doi:10.2307/3312930. ISSN 0041-9907. JSTOR 3312930.
  28. ^ Mercier, Hugo; Sperber, Dan (2017). The Enigma of Reason. Harvard University Press.
  29. ^ Iyengar, Shanto; Krupenkin, Masha (25 April 2018). "Partisanship as Social Identity; Implications for the Study of Party Polarization". The Forum. 16 (1): 23–45. doi:10.1515/for-2018-0003. ISSN 1540-8884.
  30. ^ Nettasinghe, Buddhika; Rao, Ashwin; Jiang, Bohan; Percus, Allon G.; Lerman, Kristina (22 April 2025). "In-Group Love, Out-Group Hate: A Framework to Measure Affective Polarization via Contentious Online Discussions". Proceedings of the ACM on Web Conference 2025. WWW '25. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery. pp. 560–575. arXiv:2412.14414. doi:10.1145/3696410.3714935. ISBN 979-8-4007-1274-6.
  31. ^ Martínez-España, Raquel; Fernández-Pedauye, Julio; Lucía, José Giner-Pérez de; Rojo-Martínez, Jose Miguel; Bakdid-Albane, Kaoutar; García-Escribano, Juan José (2024). "Methodology for Measuring Individual Affective Polarization Using Sentiment Analysis in Social Networks". IEEE Access. 12: 102035–102049. doi:10.1109/access.2024.3431999. hdl:10251/212144. ISSN 2169-3536.
  32. ^ "Reducing Pernicious Polarization: A Comparative Historical Analysis of Depolarization". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 5 May 2022. Retrieved 23 October 2025.
  33. ^ "Democracy Report 2025: 25 Years of Autocratization" (PDF). V-Dem Institute. 6 March 2025. Retrieved 23 October 2025.
  34. ^ "The Populist Wave and Polarization in Europe". Modern Diplomacy. 6 October 2024. Retrieved 23 October 2025.
  35. ^ "Charlie Kirk Murder Divides European Parliament Amid Rising Political Polarization". Geneva Council for Rights & Liberties. 12 September 2025. Retrieved 23 October 2025.
  36. ^ "European Parliament Declines Tribute for Slain Conservative Activist Charlie Kirk". The Watcher Post. 12 September 2025. Retrieved 23 October 2025.
  37. ^ "Party System Ideological Polarization in Western Europe". Taylor & Francis. 15 September 2024. Retrieved 23 October 2025.
  38. ^ "Democracy Reports". V-Dem Institute. Retrieved 23 October 2025.
  39. ^ "The Populist Wave and Polarization in Europe". Modern Diplomacy. 6 October 2024. Retrieved 23 October 2025.
  40. ^ "Charlie Kirk Murder Divides European Parliament Amid Rising Political Polarization". Geneva Council for Rights & Liberties. 12 September 2025. Retrieved 23 October 2025.
  41. ^ "Democracy Report 2025" (PDF). V-Dem Institute. 6 March 2025. Retrieved 23 October 2025.
  42. ^ "What Are the Solutions to Political Polarization?". Greater Good Magazine. Retrieved 23 October 2025.

Category:Politics of Europe

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