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Chinese biological weapons program

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The People's Republic of China (PRC) operated an active biological weapons program during the Cold War, during which it weaponized large quantities of ricin, botulinum toxin, anthrax, plague, cholera, and tularemia.[1][2] Some Western governments[who?] and security analysts believe the program remains covertly active,[3][4] and likely involves dual-use technology.[5] The PRC ratified the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in and Chinese officials have claimed that the country has never engaged in biological activities with offensive military applications. Members of the US intelligence community strongly suspect that the PRC has, as of 2015, at least 42 facilities that may be involved in research, development, production, or testing of biological agents.[6][3]

Most Western biological weapons experts believe that currently China can produce a wide range of biological threat agents and sophisticated delivery systems on very short notice.[2] Many life science researchers in Chinese academia and industry serve as People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers, and the latest 2020 revision of The Science of Military Strategy, a cornerstone doctrinal text for PLA officers, states that China anticipates that biotechnology, including biological weapons, will dominate the modern battlefield.[2]

Senior PLA officials have expressed a distinct interest in ethnic bioweapons, agents which can be targeted at a particular genetic makeup. In 2017, former president of PLA National Defense University (PLA NDU), General Zhang Shibo, suggested that “biotechnology is gradually showing strong signs characteristic of an offensive capability, including the possibility that specific ethnic genetic attacks could be employed."[2] In 2020, another professor at PLA NDU spoke of the "huge war effectiveness" of a "targeted attack that destroys a race, or a specific group of people."[7][8] Some believe this interest is borne partly of concern for the vulnerabilities inherent in the monoethnicity of China's population, which is 91 percent Han Chinese. Others believe the PLA's interest extends to offensive capabilities.[7]

History

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Cold War

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During the Cultural Revolution, citizens wrote letters to the Zhongnanhai residence of government leaders, warning of attacks on facilities that stored pathogenic bacteria, poisonous plant samples, toxicants, and other dangerous substances.[9]: 218–220 

Biological Weapons Convention ratification

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On 15 November 1984, twelve years after the treaty opened for signature, the People's Republic of China ratified the Biological Weapons Convention.[10] It included the following three-pointed declaration:[11]

  1. The fundamental spirit of the Biological Weapons Convention is consistent with China's consistent position and promotes the struggle of peace-loving countries and peoples against aggression and in defense of world peace. China, as a victim of biological (bacteriological) weapons, has never produced or possessed such weapons. It will continue to do so. However, the Chinese government believes that this Convention also contains certain shortcomings. For example, the Convention did not clearly provide for a "prohibition of the use" of biological weapons, nor did it provide for specific and effective control and verification measures, and its prosecution procedure for violations lacks effective sanctions. The Chinese government hopes that these shortcomings will be addressed at an appropriate time.
  2. The Chinese government also expresses hope for the speedy development and conclusion of a Convention on the Comprehensive Prohibition and Complete Elimination of Chemical Weapons.
  3. The signature and ratification of the Convention by the Taiwan authorities, having appropriated the name of China, on 10 April 1972 and 9 February 1973 respectively, are illegal and null and void."

Post-Cold War

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Proliferation scholars point to the Yinhe incident as a formative event for counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the context of China–United States relations.[12][13][14]

In the 1990s, U.S. officials, such as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, expressed concerns over possible Chinese biological weapon transfers to Iran and other nations.[15][16] Albright stated that she had received reports regarding transfers of dual-use items from Chinese entities to the Iranian government which concerned her and that the United States had to encourage China to adopt comprehensive export controls to prevent assistance to Iran's alleged biological weapons program. The United States acted upon the allegations on January 16, 2002, when it imposed sanctions on three Chinese firms accused of supplying Iran with materials used in the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons. In response to this, China issued export control protocols on dual use biological technology in late 2002.[16]

A large-scale Chinese state-run biological weapons program was reported to exist as recently as 2015, based on analysis from former IDF military intelligence officer Dany Shoham, integrating the findings of several different countries' defense agencies. The program reportedly includes at least 42 facilities that are involved in research, development, production, or testing of biological weapons (30 associated with the People's Liberation Army and 12 associated with the Chinese defense ministry).[6][17] US intelligence agencies assumed as early as 1993 that the PRC has maintained an operational, secretive, and sizable bioweapons arsenal that is "extremely hidden" but continuously upgraded.[6][3]

The official position of the United States Department of State, as published in a 2021 report, is that China likely operated an offensive bioweapons program before the 1984 signing of the BWC treaty, and continued to operate the program afterwards. The report also expresses concern that China may have transferred controlled biological weapons-related items to nations of international concern (e.g. Iran, similar to the Yinhe incident).[18][19][5]

In 2017, a textbook published by the People's Liberation Army National Defence University called the Science of Military Strategy debuted the potential for biological warfare to include "specific ethnic genetic attacks."[20] The same year, former People's Liberation Army general Zhang Shibo authored a book that concluded that "modern biotechnology development is gradually showing strong signs characteristic of an offensive capability," including "specific ethnic genetic attacks" (特定种族基因攻击).[20] In 2020, a professor at the same PLA university spoke of the "huge war effectiveness" of a "targeted attack that destroys a race, or a specific group of people."[7][8] A 2021 study by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies stated that the Chinese government's interest in biological weapons is driven by a recognition of its own vulnerability to genetic targeting due to a broadly homogenous population with more than 90 percent being ethnic Han Chinese.[7]

According to the 2023 China Military Power Report issued by the US Department of Defense: "the PRC continues to engage in biological activities with dual-use applications, which raise concerns regarding its compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This includes studies at PRC military medical institutions on potent toxins with dual-use applications. The PRC likely possesses capabilities relevant to chemical and biological warfare that pose a threat to U.S., Allied, and partner forces, military operations, and civilian populations."[21]

In April 2024, a United States Department of State report stated that the PLA has conducted research into dual-use marine toxins that call into question China's BWC compliance.[5] In April 2025, an update report stated that China has incorporated artificial intelligence into its bio-weapons programs.[22][23]

In 2025, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested a Chinese scientist, Yunqing Jian, for smuggling Fusarium graminearum from the PRC into the U.S.[24][25][26] Jian pled guilty to smuggling biological materials and served five months in prison.[27]

Accidents

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Ken Alibek, former director of Biopreparat, the Soviet Union's largest biological warfare program, said that China suffered a serious accident at one of its biological weapons plants in the late 1980s. Alibek claimed that Soviet reconnaissance satellites had identified a biological weapons laboratory and plant near a site for testing nuclear warheads in western China. The Soviets suspected that two separate epidemics of hemorrhagic fever that swept the region in the late 1980s were caused by an accident in a lab where Chinese scientists were weaponizing viral diseases.[28]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments" (PDF). United States Department of State. April 2022. Retrieved 2025-11-16.
  2. ^ a b c d Mauroni, Al; Cross, Glenn (2025-06-10). "Will China Force a Rethink of Biological Warfare?". War on the Rocks. Retrieved 2025-07-01.
  3. ^ a b c Smith, R. Jeffrey (February 23, 1993). "China May Have Revived Germ Weapons Program, U.S. Officials Say". The Washington Post. Retrieved 30 June 2021.
  4. ^ "Wuhan lab researcher linked to military scientists, NBC News finds". NBC News. June 29, 2021. Archived from the original on 29 June 2021. Retrieved 30 June 2021.
  5. ^ a b c "China". Nuclear Threat Initiative. 13 August 2024. Retrieved 15 November 2025.
  6. ^ a b c Shoham, Dany (April–June 2015). "China's Biological Warfare Programme: An Integrative Study with Special Reference to Biological Weapons Capabilities" (PDF). Journal of Defence Studies. 9 (2). Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses: 131–156. ISSN 0976-1004. Archived (PDF) from the original on October 4, 2025.
  7. ^ a b c d Warrick, Joby; Brown, Cate (September 21, 2023). "China's quest for human genetic data spurs fears of a DNA arms race". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 2023-09-21. Retrieved 2023-09-22. A 2021 U.S. study by American weapons experts concluded that Beijing's interest in genetic weapons is driven partly by a perception that China would especially vulnerable if its adversaries develop the technology first. Compared with other countries — and especially the United States — China's population is broadly homogenous, with more than 90 percent of its people being ethnic Han Chinese.
  8. ^ a b "现代生命科技与未来战争" [Modern Life Sciences and Future Warfare]. China Internet Information Center (in Chinese). Guangming Daily. March 22, 2020. Archived from the original on September 21, 2023. Retrieved 2023-09-22.
  9. ^ MacFarquhar, Roderick; Schoenhals, Michael (2006). Mao's Last Revolution. Harvard University Press. doi:10.4159/9780674040410. ISBN 978-0-674-02332-1. JSTOR j.ctvk12s4j.
  10. ^ "UNODA Treaties Database". treaties.unoda.org. Retrieved 2025-11-17.
  11. ^ "UNODA Treaties Database". treaties.unoda.org. Retrieved 2025-11-17.
  12. ^ Croddy, Eric (2002-03-01). "China's role in the chemical and biological disarmament regimes". The Nonproliferation Review. doi:10.1080/10736700208436872.
  13. ^ Currier, Carrie Liu; Dorraj, Manochehr (2010). "In Arms We Trust: the Economic and Strategic Factors Motivating China-Iran Relations". Journal of Chinese Political Science. 15 (1): 49–69. doi:10.1007/s11366-009-9082-6. ISSN 1080-6954.
  14. ^ Medeiros, Evan S. (2001-03-01). "Rebuilding bilateral consensus: Assessing U.S.‐China arms control and nonproliferation achievements". The Nonproliferation Review. 8 (1): 131–140. doi:10.1080/10736700108436844. ISSN 1073-6700.
  15. ^ Spector, Leonard S. (September 12, 1996). "Chinese Assistance to Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Archived from the original on 2009-06-11. Retrieved 2025-11-16.
  16. ^ a b "Country Profiles: China". Nuclear Threat Initiative. May 2011. Archived from the original on 2011-08-27. Retrieved 2025-11-16.
  17. ^ Smithson, Amy E. "Beijing on Biohazards: Chinese Experts on Bioweapons Nonproliferation Issues" (PDF). James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Archived (PDF) from the original on 11 July 2021. Retrieved 30 June 2021.
  18. ^ "2005 Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments". United States Department of State. Archived from the original on 9 July 2021. Retrieved 30 June 2021.
  19. ^ "2021 Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments". United States Department of State. Archived from the original on 30 October 2021. Retrieved 30 June 2021.
  20. ^ a b Kania, Elsa; Vorndick, Wilson (August 14, 2019). "Weaponizing Biotech: How China's Military Is Preparing for a 'New Domain of Warfare'". Defense One. Archived from the original on 2023-04-02. Retrieved 2023-04-03.
  21. ^ "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China" (PDF). China Military Power Report. United States Department of Defense. 2023. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2023-10-22. Retrieved 2025-02-12.
  22. ^ "China developing deadly Marine Toxins, may be merging AI with bioweapons: U.S. Report". The Economic Times. 2025-06-04. ISSN 0013-0389. Retrieved 2025-11-16.
  23. ^ "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments" (PDF). United States Department of State. April 2025. Retrieved 2025-11-16.
  24. ^ Mendelson, Allegra; Crilly, Rob (2025-06-04). "Chinese 'terrorists' accused of smuggling toxic fungus into US". The Daily Telegraph. ISSN 0307-1235. Retrieved 2025-06-09.
  25. ^ White, Ed (3 June 2025). "US says it broke up effort to bring toxic fungus to Michigan lab from China". Associated Press. Retrieved 5 June 2025.
  26. ^ "What is Fusarium graminearum, the fungus US authorities say was smuggled in from China?". Associated Press. 2025-06-04. Retrieved 2025-06-07.
  27. ^ "Chinese scientist pleads guilty in US smuggling case and will be quickly deported". Associated Press. 2025-11-12. Retrieved 2025-11-16.
  28. ^ Broad, William J.; Miller, Judith (1999-04-05). "Soviet Defector Says China Had Accident at a Germ Plant". The New York Times. Retrieved 2025-11-16.
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