Normativity

"Normative" redirects here. For other uses, see Normative (disambiguation).

"Prescriptive" redirects here. For other uses, see Prescription (disambiguation).

Normativity is the phenomenon in human societies of designating some actions or outcomes as good, desirable, or permissible, and others as bad, undesirable, or impermissible. A norm in this sense means a standard for evaluating or making judgments about behavior or outcomes. "Normative" is sometimes also used, somewhat confusingly, to mean relating to a descriptive standard: doing what is normally done or what most others are expected to do in practice. In this sense a norm is not evaluative, a basis for judging behavior or outcomes; it is simply a fact or observation about behavior or outcomes, without judgment. Many researchers in science, law, and philosophy try to restrict the use of the term "normative" to the evaluative sense and refer to the description of behavior and outcomes as positive, descriptive, predictive, or empirical.

Normative has specialized meanings in different academic disciplines such as philosophy, social sciences, and law. In most contexts, normative means 'relating to an evaluation or value judgment.' Normative propositions tend to evaluate some object or some course of action. Normative content differs from descriptive content.

Definition

Normativity is a quality of concepts, judgments, or principles that prescribe how things ought to be. As a feature of everything that should be, it encompasses the standards or reasons that guide or justify actions and beliefs. In a slightly different sense, normativity can also refer to the capacity to establish and modify norms. Normative statements contrast with descriptive statements, which report what is the case rather than what should be the case. For example, the sentence "you should not smoke" is normative because it expresses a norm and prescribes a course of action. The sentence "you smoked yesterday", by contrast, is descriptive since it merely states a fact.

Normativity is a pervasive phenomenon in everyday life that occurs when evaluating or criticizing others and when attempting to justify one's own actions. Similarly, it is involved in practical deliberation when deciding what to do next and in theoretical reasoning when assessing whether the available evidence supports a belief. Normativity is relevant to many domains, including morality, law, politics, language, and the human sciences. Philosophers debate whether it is a unified phenomenon that applies equally to all of these cases or a heterogeneous collection of related ideas whose precise definition varies with context and domain.

Normative claims can be analyzed in terms of their content, such as a rule that should be followed, and the authority or normative force they carry. For example, some normative reasons merely favor one course of action over another, while others strictly demand a specific conduct. In either case, a normative reason does not coerce compliance: individuals may act otherwise out of ignorance or against their better judgment. Accordingly, there can be a difference between what a person desires or intends and what they normatively should do.

Normativity is closely related to norms, understood as general principles of how individuals should act or think. However, the term norm also has meanings not directly related to normativity. For example, a statistical norm is a statement about what is typical or average, such as the average height of adult men, without implying that things should be this way. Similarly, normativity is distinguished from mere regularities or common practices, such as a habit of eating dinner at a particular time. There are many normative concepts, such as right and wrong, good and bad, rational and irrational, justified and unjustified, and permitted and obligated.

The word normativity has its roots in the Latin term norma, meaning 'rule' or 'pattern'. It gave rise to the French word normatif, which entered English as the term normative in the 19th century. The word normativity was coined in the 1930s as a technical term in academic discourse.

Types

Several types of normativity are discussed in the academic literature distinguished by domain, content, authority, or perspective. Some distinctions may overlap or may be combined to form more specific subtypes. There are theoretical disagreements about whether only some types are genuine forms of normativity and whether some kinds are more fundamental than others.

Practical and theoretical

Practical normativity addresses conduct or what people should decide, intend, and do. It is interested in the standards of right action and the reasons that favor one course of action over another. It contrasts with theoretical or epistemic normativity, which governs how people should think or what they should believe. Theoretical normativity concerns mental states and belief-formation processes related to truth and knowledge. For example, the sentence "she should stop drinking" belongs to practical normativity, whereas the sentence "he should not believe the rumor without evidence" belongs to theoretical normativity.

These two types are often studied separately, with the field of ethics focusing on the practical side and the field of epistemology focusing on the theoretical side. Nonetheless, there are many parallels and interactions. For example, beliefs may influence what should be done, as when someone should buy eggs because they intend to bake a cake and believe that eggs are required. Similarly, practical consequences can influence belief norms. For instance, a person may be justified to believe that their bank is open on Saturday if it concerns a minor matter, but not if they risk losing their house by missing a mortgage payment.

In some cases, practical and theoretical normativity may conflict, raising the question of how or whether this type of dilemma can be resolved. For example, if there is strong evidence in favor of a negative opinion about a friend, theoretical normativity may require doing so while practical normativity rooted in friendship may demand granting them the benefit of doubt. Similar dilemmas can arise in cases where violating epistemic norms by believing a falsehood has positive practical consequences.

Deontic and evaluative

Deontic normativity covers norms that directly apply to right thought and action. These norms are action-guiding by telling individuals what to do and demanding certain forms of conduct, expressed through concepts such as right, wrong, obligation, and permission. Evaluative normativity, by contrast, is about values or what is good. It describes what is worthy of approval, expressed through concepts such as good, bad, praiseworthy, and virtuous.

These two forms of normativity are closely related and often overlap, as when an action is right because it is good or has good consequences. However, they are not identical and can come apart. For instance, some value considerations cannot guide actions because they are beyond anyone's control. Several theories of the relation between deontic and evaluative normativity have been suggested, including the idea that one is more fundamental and can be used to define the other. Understood in a narrow sense, normativity is sometimes limited to deontic normativity.

Objective and subjective

A requirement is objectively normative if it applies to a person regardless of what the person believes or knows about it. Subjective normativity, by contrast, encompasses information-relative demands that depend on the individual's perspective and the information available to them.

Objective and subjective normativity overlap when a person objectively should do something and at the same time subjectively believes that they should do it. However, they can come apart if the individual lacks or has false information, which can lead to actions with unintended bad consequences. This is the case in a scenario where all available evidence suggests that a pill would cure a patient's disease, although the pill is, in truth, deadly for this particular patient. In this case, the patient should take the pill in a subjective sense but not in an objective sense. Various academic debates address the relation between the two forms of normativity and whether both are equally fundamental and authoritative.

Pro tanto and all-things-considered

A normative reason is pro tanto if it favors an action or state in a certain respect or from a specific perspective. For example, if a joke is funny, then this is a pro tanto reason for telling it. However, pro tanto reasons are limited considerations that do not take everything into account and can be defeated by other reasons. If the joke would offend someone, this is a separate pro tanto reason for not telling it. Normative all-things-considered assessments, by contrast, take all relevant factors into account. They weigh all advantages and disadvantages and prescribe an action or state as a conclusive judgment not limited to domain-specific considerations.

A closely related distinction is between formal and robust normativity, also discussed as generic and authoritative normativity. Formal normativity arises from any standards or norms relative to which a mistake can be made. It is a pervasive phenomenon in everyday life, encompassing domains such as law, linguistic conventions, table manners, and games. For example, the rules of chess belong to formal normativity, like the prescription that pawns may move forward but not backward. The normative authority of this type of formal standard typically depends on context and can be overridden by other considerations. Robust normativity, by contrast, carries genuine normative force independent of contingent frameworks.

Others

Various types of normativity are distinguished by the domain to which they belong. For example, moral normativity concerns duties, rights, and moral obligations as well as standards of praise and blame. It is closely related to legal normativity, which covers the authority of the legal system, and political normativity, which encompasses the exercise of political power. Linguistic normativity, another type, is about following linguistic conventions, such as the rules of grammar. Similarly, rational normativity governs the standards of correct reasoning.

Instrumental normativity encompasses normative requirements that depend on external goals. For example, if a person should attend a concert, then they should make the necessary preparations, such as buying a ticket. In such cases, there is an end or a goal that should be achieved, and the required means of implementation in some sense inherit the normative force attached to the goal. Instrumental normativity is closely related to hypothetical normative requirements, which depend on the desires or intentions of a person. The normative force of categorical requirements, by contrast, applies independently of what an individual wants. A similar distinction is between necessary norms, which apply equally to any situation, and contingent norms, which apply only to specific circumstances or contexts. For example, region-specific laws against smoking in bars are contingent norms.

Agent-relative normativity encompasses requirements that in some sense depend on and affect a specific person but not others. It may arise from the particular social role of a person, such as standards or expectations associated with being a teacher, doctor, or mother. Previous behavior can also be a source of agent-relative normativity, like when someone should do something because they made a promise. Agent-relative normativity contrasts with agent-neutral normativity, which applies equally to everyone.

Another distinction is between constitutive and regulative norms. Constitutive norms are part of the definition of a specific activity. For example, the constitutive norms of soccer determine what counts as a goal and how players may interact with the ball. People who do not follow constitutive norms of an activity are not engaged in this activity. Regulative norms are commands, prohibitions, or permissions about how people should behave, and violating them is a type of mistake.

There are different normative statuses corresponding to whether something is obligatory, prohibited, or permitted. In some cases, it may also be possible to do more than is normatively required, a state known as supererogation. The concepts used to express normative status can be either thin or thick. Thin normative concepts express a purely normative assessment without any additional information, such as the terms ought, should, right, and wrong. Thick normative concepts include descriptive information beyond a purely normative evaluation. For instance, the terms courageous, kind, brutal, and callous not only give a normative judgment but also convey information about character and emotional quality. They typically explain why or in what sense the normative assessment applies.

Theories

Various theories of the nature and sources of normativity have been proposed. They seek to determine what all forms of normativity have in common, how normative requirements arise, and what grounds their authority. Theories further aim to explain how normative ideas motivate actions and how their demands are justified. Some address what normative statements mean (semantics) or how people can know about them (epistemology), while others address their underlying reality (metaphysics). Certain theories are mutually exclusive, meaning that if one is true, the other has to be false. Others provide complementary accounts that can be combined without contradiction. The study of the nature and sources of normativity across domains, such as ethics, epistemology, and law, is called meta-normative theory.

Realism and anti-realism

Normative realism is the view that there are objective normative facts about what is right and wrong, similar to physical facts about the weight and shape of objects. Normative realists typically hold that normative sentences can be true or false and that at least some are true. They further emphasize that their truth depends on objective facts, i.e., that it is not just a matter of opinions, feelings, or intentions, but that truth is grounded in mind-independent reality. Anti-realists deny that normativity is a substantial or fundamental feature of reality. There are intermediate positions without a universally accepted terminology. For example, the view that normativity is real but subjective does not belong to realism in a narrow sense but may be included under a broader understanding of the term.

Realist theories are divided into naturalism and non-naturalism. Naturalists argue that normative features are part of the natural world, meaning that there is no essential difference between normative facts and the empirical facts studied by the natural sciences. Non-naturalists assert that normative facts belong to a distinct part of reality. This outlook is often combined with the ideas that one cannot deduce normative sentences from empirical sentences, that empirical observation alone cannot reveal normative facts, and that a distinct source of knowledge, such as rational intuition, is required.

Realism is typically paired with cognitivism, a view about the meaning of normative sentences. Cognitivists assert that normative claims represent what the world is like and have truth values. Non-cognitivists reject the idea that normative sentences can be true or false. They usually accept that normative language has some form of meaning and have proposed several ways to explain its meaning without representation and truth values. Expressivism is one such proposal arguing that normative language is used to express personal attitudes and emotions. According to one version of expressivism, to say that an action is wrong means that the speaker dislikes the action, similar to yelling "Boo!" as a sign of disapproval. Non-cognitivism is primarily associated with anti-realism, but it is also possible to combine cognitivism with anti-realism. For example, error theory holds that normative statements have truth values and that all of them are false because there are no normative facts.

A key topic in the debate between realists and anti-realists concerns the distinctive character of normative facts, leading critics to describe normativity as an odd or "queer" phenomenon. They assert that irreducible prescriptions would be mysterious entities that are not easily integrated into a scientific worldview. A similar objection focuses on knowledge of normative facts and suggests that how people acquire and justify normative beliefs is equally odd and undermines their credibility. Supporters of realism hold that normative facts are required to explain experiences and practices associated with normativity. For instance, claims about what should be are typically formulated like claims about what is, indicating that the former can be true or false just like the latter. Another line of support maintains that when people disagree and argue about normative judgments, they implicitly assume the existence of an underlying truth since there would be no genuine disagreement otherwise.

Primitivism and reductionism

Closely related to the realism debate is the distinction between primitivism and reductionism. Primitivism, also called normativism, argues that normative concepts or facts are fundamental. This means that they cannot be defined in non-normative terms or clarified without circularity. Quietist realism combines primitivism with realism: it accepts the existence of moral phenomena but denies that any substantive explanation is possible. Instead of developing a positive account of the nature of normativity, it defends realism indirectly by diagnosing mistakes that lead philosophers to adopt anti-realism. Primitivism is typically embraced by non-naturalists to emphasize the autonomy of the normative domain from scientific explanation. However, naturalist primitivism is also possible as the view that normativity is accessible through natural investigation but not analyzable in terms of other natural phenomena.

Primitivism contrasts with reductionism, which seeks to explain normative concepts through non-normative ones. Reductionists do not outright deny the existence of normativity but hold that it is not something entirely novel or mysterious since it can be analyzed through unproblematic and well-understood concepts. Reductionism often takes the form of naturalism by seeking to show how empirical features, such as mental attitudes studied by psychologists, form the foundation of normativity. In a slightly weaker sense, reduction can also mean that one type of normative concept or fact is explained through another, such as conceptual analyses that define what ought to be in terms of reasons, values, or goals.

Reason-based

Reason-based theories, sometimes called reasons first accounts, explain normativity in terms of reasons. This approach reduces other normative concepts, such as ought, should, right, and wrong, to facts about reasons. For example, saying that someone ought to learn swimming may be interpreted as saying that there is an adequate or decisive reason to do so. Reasons are often treated as relational entities that connect a ground, such as the risk of drowning, to an appropriate response or state, such as learning to swim. Normative reasons vary in strength: not all are sufficiently strong to fully justify a course of action and they may be counterbalanced by other reasons. Accordingly, reason-based theories typically focus on the balance of reasons or argue that a sufficient or decisive reason determines the overall normative demand.

Reason-based accounts are primarily interested in normative reasons, which are distinguished from motivating reasons. From a forward-looking perspective, a motivating reason is a mental state that causes a person to act in a certain way. From a backward-looking perspective, a motivating reason explains why the person acted as they did. A normative reason, by contrast, is a fact or consideration that favors one course of action over another. It justifies what should or should not be done, regardless of whether a person responds to it. Motivating and normative reasons can overlap if a person's motivational state aligns with what normative reasons require, but they can come apart. For example, if someone falsely believes that their partner is unfaithful, there may be a motivating reason to punish them but no normative reason.

Many reason-based accounts aim to provide a unified explanation of different types of normativity, like practical normativity about what to do and theoretical normativity about what to believe. One proposed unification argues that both types are about following reasons: reasons that favor a course of action in the practical case and reasons that support a belief in the theoretical case. Some reason-based accounts also seek to define values through reasons. For instance, the buck-passing account of goodness explains evaluative normativity in terms of reasons. It maintains that something is good if its features provide adequate reasons to have a positive attitude toward it, such as a favorable feeling, emotion, and desire.

Closely connected to reason-based accounts is the idea that normativity can be defined by focusing on how it guides reasoning and action without directly relying on the notion of reasons. For example, Ralph Wedgwood suggests that a concept is normative if it sets standards of what to think and do.

Internalism and externalism

A central debate about the nature of reasons is between internalism and externalism. Internalism is the view that normative reasons depend in some sense on the psychology of a person so that the individual can, at least in principle, be motivated by them. This does not mean that the person is actually motivated. It typically has a weaker requirement: the person would be motivated under the right conditions, for instance, upon proper reflection. Internalists highlight the psychological connection between reasons and action, arguing that a fact or consideration cannot become a normative reason without this link.

Externalists accept that there is a psychological connection in some cases but deny that it is essential. For them, it is conceivable that a person is required to do something even if it is impossible for them to become motivated to do it. A central source of disagreement between internalism and externalism comes from moral absolutism, the view that some actions are wrong for anyone, independent of personal motivations and desires. For example, a moral absolutist may argue that Hitler's order to commit genocide was wrong in principle, independent of Hitler's psychology. While this outlook is compatible with externalism, it conflicts with internalism, which maintains that normative requirements must be able to guide actions.

Value-based

Value-based theories, also called value-first accounts, assert that normativity is ultimately grounded in values. They hold that values are fundamental and reduce other normative concepts to evaluative facts. The idea underlying this approach is that something should be done or ought to be the case because it is valuable or brings about values in some form.

Several value-based theories have been proposed. Consequentialism, a theory of practical normativity, asserts that an action is right if it brings about the best consequences. According to this view, the normative status of an action depends on the values of its consequences compared to the outcomes of alternative actions. Not all value-based theories rely on the idea that the sum of values should be maximized. For example, according to Joseph Raz's proposal, values provide reasons for what to do, and normativity is about compliance with all relevant reasons rather than value-maximization. A different approach, advanced by Judith Jarvis Thomson, suggests that value standards of virtues and defects govern normative standards of correctness. In the field of theoretical normativity, epistemic instrumentalism is the idea that standards of belief and justification are ultimately about epistemic values, such as truth, which act as cognitive goals.

Others

Normative formalism asserts that normativity is merely a formal feature of rules and norms. In this sense, any rule that calls for something is equally normative, including rules of games, social conventions, and moral imperatives. This view does not distinguish between unimportant or empty rules, which people may freely ignore, and robust or authoritative rules, which have genuine normative authority.

Objectualism and conceptualism disagree about the kinds of entities that have normative properties. Objectualism asserts that normativity applies to worldly objects or states of affairs, a view typically combined with realism. Conceptualism argues that normativity is primarily found in the realm of thought as an aspect of concepts or ideas. It is more closely associated with anti-realism. According to one proposal, mental phenomena are inherently normative, meaning that standards of correctness govern how they function, like justification and rationality as standards of beliefs.

Constructivism, a related perspective, suggests that normativity depends on the mind and is ultimately a product of the [[ Will (philosophy)|will]]. It asserts that norms arise and acquire authoritative force because of the fundamental principles of how people deliberate about courses of action, make decisions, and commit themselves. For example, Christine Korsgaard argues that certain universal principles act as sources of normativity because they apply to all practical agents, similar to Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative, and that an individual cannot be a practical agent if they do not follow these principles.

Korsgaard categorizes historical theories of the sources of normativity into voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and appeal to autonomy. Voluntarism grounds normativity in commands by a legitimate authority, such as God or a political ruler. Realism asserts that evaluative or normative facts have fundamental and mind-independent existence. The reflective endorsement view grounds normativity in human nature as norms that humans naturally desire, endorse, or uphold. The appeal to authority is a form of constructivism that interprets norms as fundamental laws of the will that are embedded in autonomous agents who have authority over themselves.

Epistemological theories explore how knowledge of normative statements is possible. Intuitionism holds that humans have a special cognitive ability to rationally grasp some normative statements directly as self-evident truths, similar to the immediate insight into certain mathematical principles. Other approaches see empirical observation as the source of normative knowledge or argue for coherentism, according to which normative beliefs mutually support each other by forming part of a coherent web of beliefs.

Philosophers question whether there is fundamentally only a single normative property that can explain all normative phenomena. An alternative view suggests that normativity encompasses a family of properties that express related but distinct aspects but cannot be unified. The theory of perspectivism uses this idea to explain the diversity of theories and the deep disagreements between them. It suggests that the term normativity is ambiguous by referring to several connected phenomena. This view proposes that theorists sometimes talk about distinct phenomena, meaning that they do not really disagree but merely address different questions under the same label.

Philosophy

Main articles: Fact–value distinction and Normative ethics

There are several schools of thought regarding the status of philosophically normative statements and whether they can be rationally discussed or defended. Among these schools are the tradition of practical reason extending from Aristotle through Kant to Habermas, which asserts that they can, and the tradition of emotivism, which maintains that they are merely expressions of emotions and have no cognitive content.

There is large debate in philosophy surrounding whether one can get a normative statement of such a type from an empirical one (i.e. whether one can get an 'ought' from an 'is', or a 'value' from a 'fact'). Aristotle is one scholar who believed that one could in fact get an ought from an is. He believed that the universe was teleological and that everything in it has a purpose. To explain why something is a certain way, Aristotle believed one could simply say that it is trying to be what it ought to be. On the contrary, David Hume believed one cannot get an ought from an is because no matter how much one thinks something ought to be a certain way it will not change the way it is. Despite this, Hume used empirical experimental methods whilst looking at the philosophically normative. Similar to this was Kames, who also used the study of facts and the objective to discover a correct system of morals. The assumption that 'is' can lead to 'ought' is an important component of the philosophy of Roy Bhaskar.

Philosophically normative statements and norms, as well as their meanings, are an integral part of human life. They are fundamental for prioritizing goals and organizing and planning. Thought, belief, emotion, and action are the basis of much ethical and political discourse; indeed, normativity of such a type is arguably the key feature distinguishing ethical and political discourse from other discourses (such as natural science).

Much modern moral/ethical philosophy takes as its starting point the apparent variance between peoples and cultures regarding the ways they define what is considered to be appropriate/desirable/praiseworthy/valuable/good etc. (In other words, variance in how individuals, groups and societies define what is in accordance with their philosophically normative standards.) This has led philosophers such as A. J. Ayer and J.L. Mackie (for different reasons and in different ways) to cast doubt on the meaningfulness of normative statements of such a type. However, other philosophers, such as Christine Korsgaard, have argued for a source of philosophically normative value which is independent of individuals' subjective morality and which consequently attains (a lesser or greater degree of) objectivity.

Social sciences

See also: Normative economics

In the social sciences, the term "normative" has broadly the same meaning as its usage in philosophy, but may also relate, in a sociological context, to the role of cultural 'norms'; the shared values or institutions that structural functionalists regard as constitutive of the social structure and social cohesion. These values and units of socialization thus act to encourage or enforce social activity and outcomes that ought to (with respect to the norms implicit in those structures) occur, while discouraging or preventing social activity that ought not occur. That is, they promote social activity that is socially valued (see philosophy above). While there are always anomalies in social activity (typically described as "crime" or anti-social behaviour, see also normality (behavior)) the normative effects of popularly endorsed beliefs (such as "family values" or "common sense") push most social activity towards a generally homogeneous set. From such reasoning, however, functionalism shares an affinity with ideological conservatism.

Normative economics deals with questions of what sort of economic policies should be pursued, in order to achieve desired (that is, valued) economic outcomes.

Politics

See also: Political philosophy

The use of normativity and normative theory in the study of politics has been questioned, particularly since the rise in popularity of logical positivism. It has been suggested by some that normative theory is not appropriate to be used in the study of politics, because of its value based nature, and a positive, value neutral approach should be taken instead, applying theory to what is, not to what ought to be. Others have argued, however, that to abandon the use of normative theory in politics is misguided, if not pointless, as not only is normative theory more than a projection of a theorist's views and values, but also this theory provides important contributions to political debate. Pietrzyk-Reeves discussed the idea that political science can never truly be value free, and so to not use normative theory is not entirely helpful. Furthermore, perhaps the normative dimension political study has is what separates it from many branches of social sciences.

International relations

In the academic discipline of International relations, Smith, Baylis & Owens in the Introduction to their 2008 book make the case that the normative position or normative theory is to make the world a better place and that this theoretical worldview aims to do so by being aware of implicit assumptions and explicit assumptions that constitute a non-normative position, and align or position the normative towards the loci of other key socio-political theories such as political liberalism, Marxism, political constructivism, political realism, political idealism and political globalization.

Law

See also: Normative jurisprudence

In law, as an academic discipline, the term "normative" is used to describe the way something ought to be done according to a value position. As such, normative arguments can be conflicting, insofar as different values can be inconsistent with one another. For example, from one normative value position the purpose of the criminal process may be to repress crime. From another value position, the purpose of the criminal justice system could be to protect individuals from the moral harm of wrongful conviction.

Standards documents

The CEN-CENELEC Internal Regulations describe "normative" as applying to a document or element "that provides rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results" which are mandatory.

Normative elements are defined in International Organization for Standardization Directives Part 2 as "elements that describe the scope of the document, and which set out provisions". Provisions include "requirements", which are criteria that must be fulfilled and cannot be deviated from, and "recommendations" and "statements", which are not necessary to comply with.

See also

• Conformity
• Decision theory
• Economics
• Hypothesis
• Is-ought problem
• Linguistic prescription
• Norm (philosophy)
• Normative economics
• Normative ethics
• Normative science
• Philosophy of law
• Political science
• Scientific method
• Value

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Further reading

• Canguilhem, Georges, The Normal and the Pathological, ISBN 0-942299-59-0.
• Andreas Dorschel, 'Is there any normative claim internal to stating facts?', in: Communication & Cognition XXI (1988), no. 1, pp. 5–16.