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Normativity

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"Normative" redirects here. For other uses, see Normative (disambiguation).
"Prescriptive" redirects here. For other uses, see Prescription (disambiguation).

Normativity is the phenomenon in human societies of designating some actions or outcomes as good, desirable, or permissible, and others as bad, undesirable, or impermissible. A norm in this sense means a standard for evaluating or making judgments about behavior or outcomes. "Normative" is sometimes also used, somewhat confusingly, to mean relating to a descriptive standard: doing what is normally done or what most others are expected to do in practice. In this sense a norm is not evaluative, a basis for judging behavior or outcomes; it is simply a fact or observation about behavior or outcomes, without judgment. Many researchers in science, law, and philosophy try to restrict the use of the term "normative" to the evaluative sense and refer to the description of behavior and outcomes as positive, descriptive, predictive, or empirical.[1][2]

Normative has specialized meanings in different academic disciplines such as philosophy, social sciences, and law. In most contexts, normative means 'relating to an evaluation or value judgment.' Normative propositions tend to evaluate some object or some course of action. Normative content differs from descriptive content.[3]

Definition

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Normativity is a quality of concepts, judgments, or principles that prescribe how things ought to be. As a feature of everything that should be, it encompasses the standards or reasons that guide or justify actions and beliefs.[4] In a slightly different sense, normativity can also refer to the capacity to establish and modify norms.[5] Normative statements contrast with descriptive statements, which report what is the case rather than what should be the case. For example, the sentence "you should not smoke" is normative because it expresses a norm and prescribes a course of action. The sentence "you smoked yesterday", by contrast, is descriptive since it merely states a fact.[6][a]

Normativity is a pervasive phenomenon in everyday life that occurs when evaluating or criticizing others and when attempting to justify one's own actions. Similarly, it is involved in practical deliberation when deciding what to do next and in theoretical reasoning when assessing whether the available evidence supports a belief. Normativity is relevant to many domains, including morality, law, politics, language, and the human sciences.[8] Philosophers debate whether it is a unified phenomenon that applies equally to all of these cases or a heterogeneous collection of related ideas whose precise definition varies with context and domain.[9][b]

Normative claims can be analyzed in terms of their content, such as a rule that should be followed, and the authority or normative force they carry. For example, some normative reasons merely favor one course of action over another, while others strictly demand a specific conduct. In either case, a normative reason does not coerce compliance: individuals may act otherwise out of ignorance or against their better judgment. Accordingly, there can be a difference between what a person desires or intends and what they normatively should do.[11]

Normativity is closely related to norms, understood as general principles of how individuals should act or think. However, the term norm also has meanings not directly related to normativity. For example, a statistical norm is a statement about what is typical or average, such as the average height of adult men, without implying that things should be this way. Similarly, normativity is distinguished from mere regularities or common practices, such as a habit of eating dinner at a particular time.[12] There are many normative concepts, such as right and wrong, good and bad, rational and irrational, justified and unjustified, and permitted and obligated.[13]

The word normativity has its roots in the Latin term norma, meaning 'rule' or 'pattern'. It gave rise to the French word normatif, which entered English as the term normative in the 19th century. The word normativity was coined in the 1930s as a technical term in academic discourse.[14]

Types

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Several types of normativity are discussed in the academic literature distinguished by domain, content, authority, or perspective.[15] Some distinctions may overlap or may be combined to form more specific subtypes. There are theoretical disagreements about whether only some types are genuine forms of normativity and whether some kinds are more fundamental than others.[16]

Practical and theoretical

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Practical normativity addresses conduct or what people should decide, intend, and do. It is interested in the standards of right action and the reasons that favor one course of action over another. It contrasts with theoretical or epistemic normativity, which governs how people should think or what they should believe. Theoretical normativity concerns mental states and belief-formation processes related to truth and knowledge. For example, the sentence "she should stop drinking" belongs to practical normativity, whereas the sentence "he should not believe the rumor without evidence" belongs to theoretical normativity.[17]

These two types are often studied separately, with the field of ethics focusing on the practical side and the field of epistemology focusing on the theoretical side. Nonetheless, there are many parallels and interactions.[18] For example, beliefs may influence what should be done, as when someone should buy eggs because they intend to bake a cake and believe that eggs are required. Similarly, practical consequences can influence belief norms. For instance, a person may be justified to believe that their bank is open on Saturday if it concerns a minor matter, but not if they risk losing their house by missing a mortgage payment.[19]

In some cases, practical and theoretical normativity may conflict, raising the question of how or whether this type of dilemma can be resolved. For example, if there is strong evidence in favor of a negative opinion about a friend, theoretical normativity may require doing so while practical normativity rooted in friendship may demand granting them the benefit of doubt. Similar dilemmas can arise in cases where violating epistemic norms by believing a falsehood has positive practical consequences.[20]

Deontic and evaluative

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Deontic normativity covers norms that directly apply to right thought and action. These norms are action-guiding by telling individuals what to do and demanding certain forms of conduct, expressed through concepts such as right, wrong, obligation, and permission. Evaluative normativity, by contrast, is about values or what is good.[c] It describes what is worthy of approval, expressed through concepts such as good, bad, praiseworthy, and virtuous.[22][d]

These two forms of normativity are closely related and often overlap, as when an action is right because it is good or has good consequences. However, they are not identical and can come apart. For instance, some value considerations cannot guide actions because they are beyond anyone's control.[24] Several theories of the relation between deontic and evaluative normativity have been suggested, including the idea that one is more fundamental and can be used to define the other.[25] Understood in a narrow sense, normativity is sometimes limited to deontic normativity.[26]

Objective and subjective

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A requirement is objectively normative if it applies to a person regardless of what the person believes or knows about it. Subjective normativity, by contrast, encompasses information-relative demands that depend on the individual's perspective and the information available to them.[27][e]

Objective and subjective normativity overlap when a person objectively should do something and at the same time subjectively believes that they should do it. However, they can come apart if the individual lacks or has false information, which can lead to actions with unintended bad consequences. This is the case in a scenario where all available evidence suggests that a pill would cure a patient's disease, although the pill is, in truth, deadly for this particular patient. In this case, the patient should take the pill in a subjective sense but not in an objective sense.[29] Various academic debates address the relation between the two forms of normativity and whether both are equally fundamental and authoritative.[30]

Pro tanto and all-things-considered

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A normative reason is pro tanto if it favors an action or state in a certain respect or from a specific perspective. For example, if a joke is funny, then this is a pro tanto reason for telling it. However, pro tanto reasons are limited considerations that do not take everything into account and can be defeated by other reasons. If the joke would offend someone, this is a separate pro tanto reason for not telling it. Normative all-things-considered assessments, by contrast, take all relevant factors into account. They weigh all advantages and disadvantages and prescribe an action or state as a conclusive judgment not limited to domain-specific considerations.[31]

A closely related distinction is between formal and robust normativity, also discussed as generic and authoritative normativity. Formal normativity arises from any standards or norms relative to which a mistake can be made. It is a pervasive phenomenon in everyday life, encompassing domains such as law, linguistic conventions, table manners, and games. For example, the rules of chess belong to formal normativity, like the prescription that pawns may move forward but not backward. The normative authority of this type of formal standard typically depends on context and can be overridden by other considerations. Robust normativity, by contrast, carries genuine normative force independent of contingent frameworks.[32]

Others

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Various types of normativity are distinguished by the domain to which they belong. For example, moral normativity concerns duties, rights, and moral obligations as well as standards of praise and blame. It is closely related to legal normativity, which covers the authority of the legal system, and political normativity, which encompasses the exercise of political power. Linguistic normativity, another type, is about following linguistic conventions, such as the rules of grammar. Similarly, rational normativity governs the standards of correct reasoning.[33]

Instrumental normativity encompasses normative requirements that depend on external goals. For example, if a person should attend a concert, then they should make the necessary preparations, such as buying a ticket. In such cases, there is an end or a goal that should be achieved, and the required means of implementation in some sense inherit the normative force attached to the goal.[34] Instrumental normativity is closely related to hypothetical normative requirements, which depend on the desires or intentions of a person. The normative force of categorical requirements, by contrast, applies independently of what an individual wants.[35] A similar distinction is between necessary norms, which apply equally to any situation, and contingent norms, which apply only to specific circumstances or contexts. For example, region-specific laws against smoking in bars are contingent norms.[36]

Agent-relative normativity encompasses requirements that in some sense depend on and affect a specific person but not others. It may arise from the particular social role of a person, such as standards or expectations associated with being a teacher, doctor, or mother. Previous behavior can also be a source of agent-relative normativity, like when someone should do something because they made a promise. Agent-relative normativity contrasts with agent-neutral normativity, which applies equally to everyone.[37]

Another distinction is between constitutive and regulative norms. Constitutive norms are part of the definition of a specific activity. For example, the constitutive norms of soccer determine what counts as a goal and how players may interact with the ball. People who do not follow constitutive norms of an activity are not engaged in this activity. Regulative norms are commands, prohibitions, or permissions about how people should behave, and violating them is a type of mistake.[38]

There are different normative statuses corresponding to whether something is obligatory, prohibited, or permitted. In some cases, it may also be possible to do more than is normatively required, a state known as supererogation.[39] The concepts used to express normative status can be either thin or thick. Thin normative concepts express a purely normative assessment without any additional information, such as the terms ought, should, right, and wrong. Thick normative concepts include descriptive information beyond a purely normative evaluation. For instance, the terms courageous, kind, brutal, and callous not only give a normative judgment but also convey information about character and emotional quality. They typically explain why or in what sense the normative assessment applies.[40]

Philosophy

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Main articles: Fact–value distinction and Normative ethics

There are several schools of thought regarding the status of philosophically normative statements and whether they can be rationally discussed or defended. Among these schools are the tradition of practical reason extending from Aristotle through Kant to Habermas, which asserts that they can, and the tradition of emotivism, which maintains that they are merely expressions of emotions and have no cognitive content.

There is large debate in philosophy surrounding whether one can get a normative statement of such a type from an empirical one (i.e. whether one can get an 'ought' from an 'is', or a 'value' from a 'fact'). Aristotle is one scholar who believed that one could in fact get an ought from an is. He believed that the universe was teleological and that everything in it has a purpose. To explain why something is a certain way, Aristotle believed one could simply say that it is trying to be what it ought to be.[41] On the contrary, David Hume believed one cannot get an ought from an is because no matter how much one thinks something ought to be a certain way it will not change the way it is. Despite this, Hume used empirical experimental methods whilst looking at the philosophically normative. Similar to this was Kames, who also used the study of facts and the objective to discover a correct system of morals.[42] The assumption that 'is' can lead to 'ought' is an important component of the philosophy of Roy Bhaskar.[43]

Philosophically normative statements and norms, as well as their meanings, are an integral part of human life. They are fundamental for prioritizing goals and organizing and planning. Thought, belief, emotion, and action are the basis of much ethical and political discourse; indeed, normativity of such a type is arguably the key feature distinguishing ethical and political discourse from other discourses (such as natural science).[citation needed]

Much modern moral/ethical philosophy takes as its starting point the apparent variance between peoples and cultures regarding the ways they define what is considered to be appropriate/desirable/praiseworthy/valuable/good etc. (In other words, variance in how individuals, groups and societies define what is in accordance with their philosophically normative standards.) This has led philosophers such as A. J. Ayer and J.L. Mackie (for different reasons and in different ways) to cast doubt on the meaningfulness of normative statements of such a type. However, other philosophers, such as Christine Korsgaard, have argued for a source of philosophically normative value which is independent of individuals' subjective morality and which consequently attains (a lesser or greater degree of) objectivity.[44]

Social sciences

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See also: Normative economics

In the social sciences, the term "normative" has broadly the same meaning as its usage in philosophy, but may also relate, in a sociological context, to the role of cultural 'norms'; the shared values or institutions that structural functionalists regard as constitutive of the social structure and social cohesion. These values and units of socialization thus act to encourage or enforce social activity and outcomes that ought to (with respect to the norms implicit in those structures) occur, while discouraging or preventing social activity that ought not occur. That is, they promote social activity that is socially valued (see philosophy above). While there are always anomalies in social activity (typically described as "crime" or anti-social behaviour, see also normality (behavior)) the normative effects of popularly endorsed beliefs (such as "family values" or "common sense") push most social activity towards a generally homogeneous set. From such reasoning, however, functionalism shares an affinity with ideological conservatism.

Normative economics deals with questions of what sort of economic policies should be pursued, in order to achieve desired (that is, valued) economic outcomes.

Politics

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See also: Political philosophy

The use of normativity and normative theory in the study of politics has been questioned, particularly since the rise in popularity of logical positivism. It has been suggested by some that normative theory is not appropriate to be used in the study of politics, because of its value based nature, and a positive, value neutral approach should be taken instead, applying theory to what is, not to what ought to be.[45] Others have argued, however, that to abandon the use of normative theory in politics is misguided, if not pointless, as not only is normative theory more than a projection of a theorist's views and values, but also this theory provides important contributions to political debate.[46] Pietrzyk-Reeves discussed the idea that political science can never truly be value free, and so to not use normative theory is not entirely helpful. Furthermore, perhaps the normative dimension political study has is what separates it from many branches of social sciences.[45]

International relations

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In the academic discipline of International relations, Smith, Baylis & Owens in the Introduction to their 2008 [47] book make the case that the normative position or normative theory is to make the world a better place and that this theoretical worldview aims to do so by being aware of implicit assumptions and explicit assumptions that constitute a non-normative position, and align or position the normative towards the loci of other key socio-political theories such as political liberalism, Marxism, political constructivism, political realism, political idealism and political globalization.

Law

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See also: Normative jurisprudence

In law, as an academic discipline, the term "normative" is used to describe the way something ought to be done according to a value position. As such, normative arguments can be conflicting, insofar as different values can be inconsistent with one another. For example, from one normative value position the purpose of the criminal process may be to repress crime. From another value position, the purpose of the criminal justice system could be to protect individuals from the moral harm of wrongful conviction.

Standards documents

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The CEN-CENELEC Internal Regulations describe "normative" as applying to a document or element "that provides rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results" which are mandatory.[48]

Normative elements are defined in International Organization for Standardization Directives Part 2 as "elements that describe the scope of the document, and which set out provisions".[49] Provisions include "requirements", which are criteria that must be fulfilled and cannot be deviated from, and "recommendations" and "statements", which are not necessary to comply with.

See also

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Look up normativity in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.

References

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Notes

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  1. ^ Philosophers debate the precise relation between normative and descriptive claims. Some proposals deny that there is a strict distinction and define normativity in terms of non-normative phenomena.[7]
  2. ^ For example, reason-first theories of normativity provide a unified account, arguing that normativity means that there is a reason to do or think something.[10]
  3. ^ Self-interested evaluative norms, such as a person looking out for what is primarily good for them, belong to the subfield of prudential normativity.[21]
  4. ^ According to one interpretation, evaluative normativity is attitude-guiding by prescribing how people should feel or evaluate.[23]
  5. ^ Several subtypes of subjective normativity have been proposed based on the kind of information-relevance involved, for instance, whether it depends on any belief, only on reasonable beliefs, or on available evidence.[28]

Citations

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  1. ^ Bicchieri, Cristina (2005). The Grammar of Society:The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521574907.
  2. ^ Bicchieri, Cristina (2017). Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780190622053.
  3. ^ Jarvis, Thomson Judith (2008). Normativity. Chicago, Ill.: Open Court. ISBN 9780812696585. OCLC 227918828.
  4. ^
  5. ^ Debru 2011, pp. 1–2
  6. ^
  7. ^ Debru 2011, p. 4
  8. ^
  9. ^
  10. ^
  11. ^
  12. ^
  13. ^
  14. ^
  15. ^
  16. ^
  17. ^
  18. ^ McHugh, Way & Whiting 2018, pp. 1–2
  19. ^ McHugh, Way & Whiting 2018, pp. 2–3, 7–8
  20. ^ Kauppinen 2023, Lead section, § 2. Why Epistemic and Practical Reasons For Belief Don't Combine
  21. ^ Crisp 2018, pp. 800–801
  22. ^
  23. ^ Copp & Morton 2022, Lead section
  24. ^
  25. ^ Wedgwood 2013, § Normative Concepts
  26. ^
  27. ^
  28. ^ Sepielli 2012, pp. 46–48
  29. ^
  30. ^ Sepielli 2018, pp. 784–786
  31. ^
  32. ^
  33. ^
  34. ^
  35. ^ Copp & Morton 2022, § 4.6 Explaining Normativity via Categorical requirements
  36. ^ Baker 2017, pp. 576–577
  37. ^
  38. ^
  39. ^
  40. ^
  41. ^ Gray, J. W. (July 19, 2011). "The Is/Ought Gap: How Do We Get "Ought" from "Is?"". Ethical realism. Retrieved December 14, 2020.
  42. ^ Shaver, Robert. "Hume's Moral Theory?" History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 3, 1995, pp. 317–331., www.jstor.org/stable/27744669. Accessed 14 Dec. 2020.
  43. ^ Leigh Price (2019) Introduction to the special issue: normativity, Journal of Critical Realism, 18:3, 221–238 [1]
  44. ^ Korsgaard, C. (1992). "The Sources of Normativity" (PDF). The Tanner Lectures on Human Value.
  45. ^ a b Pietrzyk-Reeves, Dorota (2017). "Normative Political Theory". Teoria Polityki. 1. doi:10.4467/00000000tp.17.009.6588. S2CID 150007680.
  46. ^ Della Porta, D; Keating, M (2008). Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved 1 December 2022.
  47. ^ The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations, New York, Oxford University Press ISBN 9780199297771, Fourth edition, pp.2-13
  48. ^ "Internal Regulations, Part 3: Principles and rules for the structure and drafting of CEN and CENELEC documents" (PDF). CEN-CENELEC. 2022. Retrieved 2023-05-13.
  49. ^ "ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, Principles and rules for the structure and drafting of ISO and IEC documents". ISO IEC. 2021. Retrieved 2023-05-17.

Sources

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Further reading

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  • Canguilhem, Georges, The Normal and the Pathological, ISBN 0-942299-59-0.
  • Andreas Dorschel, 'Is there any normative claim internal to stating facts?', in: Communication & Cognition XXI (1988), no. 1, pp. 5–16.
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